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AN ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE? TITLE IX 
ENFORCEMENT IN HISTORICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
KAREN M. TANI† 
ABSTRACT 
  One of the most controversial administrative actions in recent years 
is the U.S. Department of Education’s campaign against sexual assault 
on college campuses. Using its authority under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (mandating nondiscrimination on the 
basis of sex in all educational programs and activities receiving federal 
funds), the Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has launched 
an enforcement effort that critics denounce as aggressive, manipulative, 
and corrosive of individual liberties. Missing from the commentary is 
a historically informed understanding of why this administrative 
campaign unfolded as it did. This Article offers crucial context by 
reminding readers that freedom from sexual violence was once 
celebrated as a national civil right—upon the enactment of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994—but then lost that status in a 5–4 decision 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. OCR’s recent campaign reflects a legal and 
political landscape in which at least some potential victims of sexual 
violence had come to feel rightfully connected to the institutions of the 
federal government, and then became righteously outraged by the 
endurance of such violence in their communities. OCR’s campaign also 
reflects the unique role of federal administrative agencies in this 
landscape. Thanks to the power of the purse and the conditions that 
Congress has attached to funding streams, agencies enjoy a powerful 
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form of jurisdiction over particular spaces and institutions. Attempts to 
harness this jurisdiction in service of aspirational rights claims should 
not surprise us; indeed, we should expect such efforts to continue. 
Building on this insight, the Article concludes with a research agenda 
for other scholars seeking to understand and evaluate OCR’s 
handiwork. 
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INTRODUCTION 
He said “he ‘like[d] to get girls drunk and . . . .’”1 Christy 
Brzonkala attributed these words to Antonio Morrison, several 
months after he and a fellow member of the Virginia Tech football 
team allegedly raped her in her college dormitory. The full quote 
bespoke deep disregard for women’s bodily integrity.2 Its effect, 
 
 1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (alteration in original). 
 2. The full quote, according to Brzonkala, was: “I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit 
out of them.” Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Va. 1996), 
rev’d, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub 
nom. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison allegedly made this statement to fellow students in 
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Brzonkala later recalled, was to prompt her to disclose for the first time 
her experience of sexual violation.3 Later, that experience became the 
basis for Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University,4 in 
which Brzonkala sued the university, the state comptroller, and three 
Virginia Tech students under state and federal law.5 
Brzonkala brought one of her claims under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972,6 a statute whose current 
administrative enforcement is the subject of this Article. Best known 
for its role in redressing gender disparities in college athletics, Title IX 
in fact prohibits sex discrimination in all educational programs and 
activities receiving federal financial assistance.7 Virginia Tech’s 
response to Brzonkala’s complaint of sexual assault was so flawed, she 
alleged, as to create a hostile environment and deprive her of equal 
access to education. Brzonkala and Virginia Tech ultimately settled the 
Title IX claim, resulting in modest compensation for Brzonkala but 
leaving no obvious mark on the institution.8 
A second and more famous claim, against Morrison, came from 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), enacted in the 
very fall of the alleged rapes. VAWA created a federal civil cause of 
action for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence, irrespective 
of where in the nation the crime occurred or whether the perpetrator 
 
the dormitory dining room. Id. Morrison’s only stated concern for her body, Brzonkala averred, 
was that it not transmit any “fucking diseases” to him during the rapes. Id.  
 3. Patrick Tracey, Christy’s Crusade, MS., Apr.–May 2000, at 53, 58–59. 
 4. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev’d, 132 
F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th. Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 5. Id. at 781. As with many cases of sexual assault, no criminal charges were filed, owing in 
part to the time lag between the alleged assault and Brzonkala’s formal report. Tracey, supra note 
3, at 54. On the typicality of failure to report sexual violence, see generally Michelle J. Anderson, 
Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action 
Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907 (2001). 
 6. Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012).  
 7. Id.  
 8. See W. SCOTT LEWIS, SAUNDRA K. SCHUSTER & BRETT A. SOKOLOW, 
GAMECHANGERS: RESHAPING CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT THROUGH LITIGATION, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR HIGHER EDUC. RISK MGMT. 5 (2010), https://www.ncherm.org/documents/2010
NCHERMWhitepaperFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/P73P-9QU3] (confirming the settlement 
amount and describing it as “not enough to get some lawyers out of bed in the morning”); Virginia 
Tech Settles Lawsuit with Brzonkala, VA. TECH NETLETTER (Mar. 2000), http://www.vtmonthly.
vt.edu/march00/lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/JA4W-AFYX] (reporting that the case settled for 
$75,000, a mere fraction of the $4.3 million damage award Brzonkala initially sought). 
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was a “state actor.”9 Brzonkala’s VAWA claim formed the basis for 
United States v. Morrison,10 in which the Supreme Court struck down 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy.11 The partial quote at the start of this 
Article—including the awkward ellipsis—comes from Morrison’s 
majority opinion, in which Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted what 
the alleged rapist “like[d] to [do]” to women, but deemed Morrison’s 
precise words too “debased,” “vulgar,” and “offen[sive]” to include.12 
Chief Justice Rehnquist omitted, too, Congress’s careful 
documentation of the role of such words and actions in depriving 
women of their basic rights and freedoms. These omissions eased the 
way for the majority’s ultimate conclusion—that in attempting to 
create and enforce a national right to be free from sexual violence, 
Congress had overstepped even its most generous constitutional grants 
of authority.13 
Americans seeking greater federal attention to sexual violence 
now have a different set of words to rally behind, and this phrase is 
harder to circumnavigate: one in five. According to a 2007 study 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), one in every 
five undergraduate women—20 percent—will have experienced 
attempted or completed sexual assault between the moment she sets 
foot on campus and the end of her college career.14 Organizers have 
 
 9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40302, 108 Stat. 
1902, 1941–42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
 10. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 11. Id. at 602. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at 617 (holding that Congress overstepped its authority under the Commerce 
Clause, which the Court had interpreted broadly since the New Deal, and Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 14. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY at xii 
(2007). Studies predating and postdating this study have produced similar findings. For previous 
studies, see BONNIE S. FISHER, FRANCIS T. CULLEN & MICHAEL G. TURNER, THE SEXUAL 
VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 10–11, 15–16 (2000); Catherine G. Harder, Rape on 
Campus: Description, Concerns, and Intervention Strategies, 1986 J. IND. U. STUDENT PERSONNEL 
ASS’N. 16, 16; Mary P. Koss, Christine A. Gidycz & Nadine Wisniewski, The Scope of Rape: 
Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher 
Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 162 (1987). For post-2007 
studies (some of which suggest an even higher rate than one in five), see DAVID CANTOR ET AL., 
REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT at xiii–xiv (2015); CHRISTOPHER KREBS ET AL., CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY 
VALIDATION STUDY: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT, at ES-6 to ES-7 (Jan. 2016); Christopher P. 
Krebs et al., College Women’s Experiences with Physically Forced, Alcohol- or Other Drug-
Enabled, and Drug-Facilitated Sexual Assault Before and Since Entering College, 57 J. AM. C. 
HEALTH 639, 639 (2009); Nick Anderson & Scott Clement, College Sexual Assault: 1 in 5 College 
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also found a new institution to champion their cause: the U.S. 
Department of Education (DOE), through its Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR). Citing the “deeply troubling” one-in-five statistic, an April 4, 
2011 “Dear Colleague Letter” (DCL) from OCR reminded 
educational institutions that failure to respond to sexual violence could 
create a hostile environment for protected classes of students, thus 
running afoul of Title IX and triggering a loss of federal funds.15 
Pushing OCR’s interpretation of the law well beyond where it was 
when Brzonkala filed suit, the letter then clarified the steps that schools 
should take to ensure full compliance with Title IX. These included 
implementing particular procedures for the “prompt and equitable” 
resolution of complaints of sexual assault, as well as taking proactive 
and corrective measures to combat the problem.16 OCR’s subsequent 
 
Women Say They Were Violated, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
sf/local/2015/06/12/1-in-5-women-say-they-were-violated [http://perma.cc/CYH8-YDHE]; Glenn 
Kessler, One in Five Women in College Sexually Assaulted: An Update on This Statistic, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/12/17/one-in-
five-women-in-college-sexually-assaulted-an-update/?utm_term=.3bd54145e045 [https://perma.
cc/UMR9-3C4Q]. Some scholars have questioned the accuracy of these studies. See, e.g., R. Shep 
Melnick, Sexual Harassment and the Evolving Civil Rights State 5–6 (Apr. 15, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://caps.gov.harvard.edu/files/caps/files/sexual_harassment_and_evolving_civil_
right_state.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4PR-PHFW]. But in public discourse, these critiques have been 
overshadowed by a wealth of anecdotal evidence that appears to confirm the widespread nature 
of the problem. See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape and Wishing She Hadn’t, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2014, at A1; Richard Pérez-Peña, Account of Rape Brings Tension to Forefront at College, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2012, at A15; THE HUNTING GROUND (Weinstein Co. 2015); Vanessa 
Grigoriadis, Meet the College Women Who Are Starting a Revolution Against Campus Sexual 
Assault, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 21, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/09/emma-sulkowicz-
campus-sexual-assault-activism.html [https://perma.cc/ZD7A-YKN7]. 
 15. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 DCL], http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ9J-WTX9]. Title IX mandates 
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Educational Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012). Title IX technically does not govern all colleges and universities, only 
those that receive federal funding. In practice, however, the vast majority of such institutions—
both public and private—accept federal funding and thus fall within the law’s ambit. Id. §§ 1681–
1688. As with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the DOE is the agency in charge of initiating 
defunding under Title IX. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012); 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
 16. 2011 DCL, supra note 15, at 6. OCR described the 2011 DCL as a “significant guidance 
document,” one that signaled how the agency would evaluate schools’ compliance with their legal 
obligations. Id. at 1 n.1. “Significant guidance document” is a legal term of art. See OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES 7–9 (Jan.  
18, 2007), https://whitehouse.gov/sites/deafult/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L3TK-A4SM] (defining the term). 
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enforcement campaign—implicating over 330 institutions of higher 
education to date—surprised many observers with its breadth and 
intensity and has resulted in significant changes to campus policies and 
practices.17 
Most scholarly accounts of OCR’s efforts focus on these more 
recent (post-2011) events. Many proceed from there to sharp criticisms. 
Legal scholars have been especially alert to the due process, legitimacy, 
and accountability concerns that have long been central to 
administrative law. For example, they have questioned OCR’s 
attentiveness to the civil liberties of individuals affected by its policies; 
they have critiqued OCR’s reliance on informal guidance documents 
rather than binding, notice-and-comment rulemaking; and they have 
accused OCR of abusing its power over the institutions it regulates, by 
placing them in a position where, realistically, they cannot question 
OCR’s legal interpretations.18 As for OCR’s motivations, more 
supportive accounts perceive a good-faith effort to enforce the 
government’s commitment to educational equality in the face of 
striking new empirical evidence of campus sexual assault. Less 
supportive accounts have suggested a power-hungry federal 
bureaucracy, eager to expand into new domains,19 as well as an agency 
fallen prey to identity politics.20 
Without trivializing such concerns, this Article places OCR’s 
recent enforcement work in a different, more historical context in 
order to help explain the power and appeal of the agency’s efforts. Part 
I connects OCR’s recent handiwork to an older campaign—a campaign 
to recognize women’s vulnerability to sexual violence as a marker of 
inequality and to make freedom from sexual violence a nationally 
recognized civil right. Proponents of this right have fought for it in 
Congress and the courts, with a mixed record of success. More recently 
 
 17. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., http://
projects.chronicle.com/titleix [https://perma.cc/V26N-6EKD].  
 18. For a fuller account of these critiques, see infra Part III. OCR’s approach to transgender 
access to school bathrooms has produced many of the same critiques.  
 19. The most prominent expression of this view is Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex 
Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (2016). Elsewhere I have critiqued that view, on the ground 
that federal regulation of sexuality is nothing new. See Melissa Murray & Karen Tani, Something 
Old, Something New: Reflections on the Sex Bureaucracy, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 122, 122–27 
(2016). 
 20. See, e.g., KC JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR, JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY: THE 
ATTACK ON DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 36 (2017); Laura Kipnis, Sexual 
Paranoia Strikes Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.chronicle.com/
article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351 [https://perma.cc/CXC2-E4U9]. 
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they have made headway within the administrative state, thanks to 
administrative power over spaces where sexual violence is manifest 
(college campuses) and to the evolving expectations of some regulatory 
beneficiaries (college-age women). To be clear, this is not an argument 
about internal agency decisionmaking or about the sincerity of OCR 
officials’ commitment to educational equality. The claim is that for a 
number of people involved in OCR’s enforcement campaign—ranging 
from former Vice President Joseph Biden to prominent Title IX 
litigators to leading campus activists—that campaign is bound up with 
a deeper hope. It is the hope that America’s governing institutions 
might yet make good on VAWA’s promise—recognizing the role of 
sexual violence in constructing and perpetuating gendered forms of 
inequality and affirming the incompatibility of such inequality with 
American citizenship.21 
Part I, standing alone, makes an important contribution to the 
literature on this topic because it suggests that the convictions 
underlying OCR’s current campaign are not going away—no matter 
how much law professors question the legal legitimacy of OCR’s 
actions. It also suggests that OCR may remain an appealing site for 
claims-making and advocacy, even with a dramatic change in executive 
leadership and notwithstanding the criticisms flagged above. 
This Article goes beyond historical contextualization and 
reframing, however, to identify productive ways for scholars to explore 
the vista that Part I opens up. To that end, Part II highlights other 
historical examples of federal administrative agencies developing and 
advancing novel rights claims. These examples suggest a particular set 
of research questions for those interested in the rights-generating 
aspect of OCR’s campaign against sexual assault. Part III explores—
but does not resolve—three such questions. First, what are the 
implications of filtering aspirational rights claims through regulated 
entities (here, colleges and universities) rather than through courts or 
other governmental adjudicative bodies? This question flows from the 
observation that although agencies have various ways of advancing 
new rights, their ability to enforce those rights is often legally or 
pragmatically constrained. Second, what are the implications of 
 
 21. See Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and 
Cautions, 125 YALE L.J. F. 281, 281 (2016) (linking OCR’s efforts to “a new civil rights 
movement” comprised of “smart, courageous survivors of gender-based violence—virtually all of 
whom are current undergraduates or recent college graduates”—and “multiple generations of 
anti-gender-based violence activists, attorneys, leaders, and scholars”).  
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advancing such rights using a form of lawmaking (administrative 
interpretation of statutes) that is arguably more vulnerable to change 
than other forms of lawmaking (statutory enactment and judicial 
decisionmaking)? The flexibility that allows for agencies to be rights 
pioneers calls into question the durability and strength of the rights 
they articulate. Third, does it matter that administratively created 
rights tend to implicate only pockets of a population that may wish to 
claim the right (here, only those attending institutions of higher 
education)? This unevenness follows from agencies’ limited 
jurisdiction and is therefore not surprising, but it is in tension with the 
ideals of equal protection and uniform treatment. The Article 
concludes with ruminations on the paradigm of governance and 
citizenship that appears to be at stake. 
I.  FREEDOM FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A CIVIL RIGHT: THE 
PATH TOWARD THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Twenty-five years ago, in an underacknowledged law review 
article, lawyer Terry Nicole Steinberg drew on her legal training and 
her disturbing experience with an attempted acquaintance rape to 
propose a novel solution to the problem of campus sexual assault: the 
DOE should treat a university’s failure to address this problem as a 
form of discrimination against women students, and therefore a 
violation of Title IX.22 Given the violence-against-women legislation 
that had just been introduced in Congress, the proposal was timely and 
appropriate.23 It did, however, entail “sweeping change” in the existing 
approach to Title IX.24 
In 1991, such a change would have been not only “sweeping,” but 
also “radical,” in Steinberg’s own words.25 Courts had recognized 
sexual harassment in the workplace as a form of illegal sex 
discrimination, but the wider American public was only just becoming 
acquainted with this notion. And although lawmakers were alert to 
forcible, stranger rape on college campuses—as evidenced by 
Congress’s response to the rape and murder of Jeanne Clery in her 
 
 22. Terry Nicole Steinberg, Rape on College Campuses: Reform through Title IX, 18 J.C. & 
U.L. 39, 39–40 (1991). 
 23. Id. at 66–67. 
 24. Id. at 41. 
 25. Id. at 42. 
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college dormitory in 198626—they barely registered the many other 
coercive sexual encounters that were part of campus culture.27 Indeed, 
such encounters were uncontroversial plot points in some of that era’s 
most beloved portrayals of young adult dating life.28 
Today, however, Steinberg’s article appears prescient. This Part 
provides an account of developments between then and now, when 
Steinberg’s proposal went from an outside-the-box solution for the 
newly recognized phenomenon of campus sexual assault to become the 
actual response of the DOE’s Office for Civil Rights. The resulting 
narrative reframes OCR’s current enforcement campaign, by 
describing how freedom from gender-motivated sexual violence 
became a national civil right—under VAWA—and then lost that status 
at the hands of a bare majority of the Supreme Court. This Part also 
explains why, well before 2011, the DOE became a relatively appealing 
site for claiming a right to be free from sexual violence—and why the 
agency will likely remain a repository for such aspirational claims. 
A. The Recognition of Sexual Imposition as Sex Discrimination and 
the Enactment of the Violence Against Women Act  
Many accounts of the DOE’s enforcement campaign against 
sexual assault begin in 2011, with OCR’s Dear Colleague Letter. But 
there is another origin story that deserves attention: the decades-long 
push for a federal response to sexual violence, culminating in the 
enactment of VAWA in 1994. VAWA has multiple facets and is the 
 
 26. Congress’s response was the enactment of the Crime Awareness and Campus Security 
Act, popularly known as the Clery Act. Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. 101-542, tit. II, § 204, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012 & Supp. 2014). The legislation dates back to 
1987, when it was introduced to Congress as the “Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security 
Act.” CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM 
AND THE SOLUTION 168–69 (1993).  
 27. See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 26, at 168–69 (describing the enactment of the 
Ramstad Amendment to the Higher Education Act (1992), which broke new ground by 
encouraging institutions of higher education to have formal policies regarding sexual assault and 
to include in those policies attention to acquaintance rape and nonforcible sex offenses).  
 28. See LAURA L. FINLEY, DOMESTIC ABUSE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN POPULAR 
CULTURE 45 (2016) (“Sixteen Candles [1984] glamorizes nonconsensual sex between a sober guy 
and a drunk girl when the uber-popular Jake tells nerdy Ted he could do whatever he wanted 
with his passed out girlfriend, and then hands the keys over to the freshman and wishes him good 
luck.”); Adam Lankford, Are There Reasons for Optimism in the Battle Against Sexual Assault?, 
10 SOC. COMPASS 38, 44 (2016) (“Going on a ‘panty raid’ through a dorm full of screaming 
women, using hidden cameras to film a girl showering, or wearing a mask and tricking a woman 
into having sex was seen as the stuff of comedy for Animal House (1978) and Revenge of the 
Nerds (1984).”). 
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product of many hands, but one of the driving forces behind it was the 
conviction of feminist activists and their allies that freedom from sexual 
violence ought to be a nationally recognized right—a civil right—rather 
than a privilege bestowed by state and local actors.29 
A civil rights framing (as opposed to a more conventional criminal 
law or tort law framing) was not intuitive to all policymakers in the late 
twentieth century. But the logic is consistent with the nation’s earliest 
civil rights laws, as well as with the experiences of Americans who lived 
through the Civil War and Reconstruction, the founding era of modern 
American civil rights.30 Civil rights are about citizenship, in the 
broadest sense of that word. In the United States, citizenship has come 
to mean the ability to participate in public life on full and equal terms; 
equal access to public resources and decisionmaking bodies; equal 
opportunity to earn a living; and equal protection from those wielding 
public power. For a generation of feminist scholars and activists, sexual 
violence implicated precisely these public rights and obligations. By 
1994, they had spent decades making the case. 
Feminist advocacy around sexual harassment was an early battle 
in this long campaign. In the 1970s, when the concept of sexual 
harassment entered the mainstream, it was hardly a new phenomenon, 
but it was a new problem. Feminists made it so, by documenting its 
prevalence and showing its harmful effects.31 By the mid-1970s, some 
feminists had gone further, arguing that sexual harassment was in fact 
already illegal, at least when it occurred in workplaces covered by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act. As feminist theorist Catherine MacKinnon 
explained in 1975, in a law school paper that would become the core of 
her influential 1979 book, sexual harassment systematically 
disadvantaged women in the workplace in much the same way that 
racial harassment disadvantaged those who were nonwhite. It 
therefore constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, even when that 
 
 29. As this last sentence suggests, this historical excavation could easily go deeper, to include 
numerous failed efforts to reform the criminal justice process at the state and local levels.  
 30. See generally HANNAH ROSEN, TERROR IN THE HEART OF FREEDOM: CITIZENSHIP, 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, AND THE MEANING OF RACE IN THE POSTEMANCIPATION SOUTH (2006) 
(detailing the central role of sexual violence in white resistance of African Americans’ claims to 
equal citizenship in the decades after the Civil War and arguing that, in speaking out about sexual 
violence, black women asserted their rights and identities as U.S. citizens). 
 31. FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 218–45 (2009). For an 
exhaustive account of this history, see generally CARRIE N. BAKER, THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT (2007).  
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discrimination did not result in tangible, negative employment 
consequences.32 
By 1980, lower federal courts had embraced this expansive reading 
of Title VII, as had the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).33 Both victories stemmed in part from black 
women plaintiffs’ willingness to embody the race–sex analogy at the 
heart of MacKinnon’s argument.34 It also surely mattered that Eleanor 
Holmes Norton was then head of the EEOC: Holmes Norton was a 
protégé of one of the great feminist and civil rights lawyers of the 
twentieth century, Pauli Murray, and had spent much of her career 
exploring legal responses to racial and sex inequality.35 In 1986, the 
Supreme Court endorsed that interpretation as well, in a case in which 
bank employee Mechelle Vinson alleged years of unwelcome sexual 
contact by her direct supervisor but no adverse impact on her 
employment status or pay.36 
Vinson’s suit touched a nerve for some conservatives because it 
appeared to involve a “voluntary” sexual relationship,37 while for 
feminists that same relationship looked utterly nonconsensual.38 
Bridging that distance in understanding was another aspect of 
feminists’ work during these years. They did so by documenting 
women’s routine experiences with sexual coercion, including the 
 
 32. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 4–7 (1979); STREBEIGH, supra note 31, at 230–41, 249–50. 
 33. STREBEIGH, supra note 31, at 241–80. 
 34. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 144–45 (2011); Judy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of 
Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 41–44 (1981). 
 35. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 116–17 (documenting Norton’s connection to Murray and 
her work at the EEOC and elsewhere in furtherance of women’s equality); STREBEIGH, supra 
note 31, at 230–32 (noting that in the early 1970s, Norton taught one of the earliest known courses 
on women and the law, and that in 1975, as a member of the New York City Commission on 
Human Rights, she encouraged attention to the issue of sexual harassment). For an overview of 
Pauli Murray’s contributions and references to other scholarly work on Murray, see generally 
Serena Mayeri, Pauli Murray and the Twentieth-Century Quest for Legal and Social Equality, 2 
IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 80 (2013). 
 36. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  
 37. STREBEIGH, supra note 31, at 276–78. 
 38. Vinson connected all of her sexual interactions with her supervisor to her fear of losing 
her job and characterized several encounters as forcible rape. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60. 
For a fuller account of the facts alleged, see STREBEIGH, supra note 31, at 209–17. On the 
involvement of feminists, including MacKinnon, in the case, see id. at 279–99. 
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underacknowledged phenomenon of “acquaintance rape.”39 They also 
showed how difficult it was for victims of sexual assault to achieve legal 
redress, both because of the disadvantageous ways that state law 
defined sex crimes and the biases that pervaded the justice system.40 
Paired with a growing literature on domestic violence, these findings 
painted a picture in which violence against women was common and 
legal redress rare. 
There were many ways of making sense of this picture, but one 
powerful interpretation came, again, from Catherine MacKinnon. She 
characterized sexual violence as a means of constructing and enforcing 
gender difference—a way of subordinating women to men.41 “What is 
wrong with rape,” MacKinnon explained in a canonical 1989 text, “is 
that it . . . expresses and reinforces women’s inequality to men.”42 
Echoing critiques that black women in particular had long voiced,43 
 
 39. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 352–
53 (1975); ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, 
FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 11–12 (1988).  
 40. See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES 
WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987) (documenting biases within the legal system that discourage and 
disadvantage women rape victims); H. FIELD & L. BEINEN, JURORS AND RAPE (1980) (analyzing 
the effects of juror, victim, defendant, and case characteristics on rape convictions and acquittals); 
Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Women’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1977) (documenting biases against rape victims held by juries and police); Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 
280 (1987) (examining indications of gender bias in the judicial system). 
 41. For examples of sources that characterize sexual violence in this way, see generally 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 39; ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 
(1981); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
(1987); MACKINNON, supra note 32; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY]; 
DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE (2d. ed. 1984); 
Diana Scully & Joseph Marolla, “Riding the Bull at Gilley’s”: Convicted Rapists Describe the 
Rewards of Rape, 32 SOC. PROBS. 251 (1985). This brand of scholarship is sometimes referred to 
as “dominance feminism.” On the emergence of dominance theory and its place in the broader 
landscape of feminist legal theory, see generally Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and 
Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).  
 42. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 41, at 182. 
 43. See, e.g., Angela Y. Davis, Rape, Racism and the Capitalist Setting, 9 BLACK SCHOLAR 
24, 25 (1978) (describing the rape of black women in the post–Civil War period as publicly 
sanctioned “attempts to thwart the drive for black equality” and noting that in 1978, black women 
rape victims continued to receive “little if any sympathy from . . . men in uniforms and robes”). 
See generally DANIELLE L. MCGUIRE, AT THE DARK END OF THE STREET: BLACK WOMEN, 
RAPE, AND RESISTANCE—A NEW HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM ROSA 
PARKS TO THE RISE OF BLACK POWER, at xviii-xx (2010) (recapping black women’s long history 
of speaking out about sexual assault and connecting sexual violence to state-sanctioned white 
supremacy).  
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MacKinnon also connected sexual violence directly to civic standing, 
by emphasizing the message sent when the state responded—or failed 
to respond—to acts of sexual violation. Stated simply, “[r]ape with 
legal impunity” creates “second-class citizens.”44 
From this scholarship and from the recognition of sexual 
harassment in the workplace as illegal employment discrimination, it 
was not a leap to ask lawmakers to recognize sexual violence as a civil 
rights violation—something that undermined the victim’s inclusion in 
the polity just as surely as being denied the vote or access to public 
space. Victoria Nourse, a lawyer for the Senate Judiciary Committee 
(now a law professor), served as an important conduit between feminist 
thinking and legislative drafting. In 1990, Senator Joseph Biden, then 
chair of the committee, tasked her with thinking through how Congress 
might address violence against women.45 Though not previously 
familiar with feminist legal theory, Nourse had a “Brandeisian” 
approach to research—that is, one that went well beyond case law and 
doctrine46—and it led her directly to feminist legal scholars.47 A second 
important conduit between feminist thinking and Capitol Hill was Sally 
Goldfarb, an attorney at the National Organization for Women’s Legal 
Defense Fund (NOW LDF) and a former student of MacKinnon’s. 
After Biden green-lighted the idea of framing sexual violence as a civil 
rights violation, akin to the race-based violence targeted by landmark 
Reconstruction-era statutes, Nourse brought NOW LDF into the 
drafting process. Goldfarb engaged MacKinnon herself in their work.48 
Many drafts preceded the bill that ultimately became VAWA, but 
the civil rights remedy was always at the core. The final text explicitly 
 
 44. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 41, at 182. 
 45. Biden had reportedly been troubled by the issue since at least 1981, when he 
unsuccessfully urged the committee to do something about marital rape. STREBEIGH, supra note 
31, at 312–13; see also Panel One: Present at the Creation: Drafting and Passing the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA), 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 511, 518 (2010) (comment by Victoria 
Nourse) (discussing her collaboration with Biden in drafting VAWA).  
 46. Panel One, supra note 45, at 518 (comment by Victoria Nourse). 
 47. Nourse encountered such sources as Susan Estrich’s powerful 1986 Yale Law Journal 
article, entitled Rape, in which Estrich drew on her own experience of sexual violation to elucidate 
the deep antivictim biases that pervaded the criminal law of rape and sexual assault. STREBEIGH, 
supra note 31, at 315 (citing Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)). Nourse’s research 
also led her to a more recent article by Robin West, in which West framed state law marital rape 
exemptions as contrary to women’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws and thus 
an appropriate target of congressional action. STREBEIGH, supra note 31, at 328 (citing Robin 
West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. 
REV. 45 (1990)). 
 48. STREBEIGH, supra note 31, at 343–44. 
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incorporated the idea of a national right to be free from sexual 
violence: “All persons within the United States shall have the right to 
be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender . . . .”49 VAWA’s 
drafters and supporters were under no illusions about the novelty of 
what they had done, even if they had identified historical analogues to 
support their cause. The civil rights remedy was “unprecedented,” 
Nourse conceded, and represented “the creation of [a] new substantive 
right.”50 
B. A Right Without a (Judicial) Remedy 
In an essay drafted around 1998, feminist legal scholar Robin West 
made an astute observation about the sexual demands that the 
powerful had long made on those with less power: almost overnight, 
such behavior had transformed from “an unnamed, pervasive, natural, 
and hence invisible” feature of public life, unlikely to sustain even a 
private tort action, to “a clear cut deprivation of civil and constitutional 
rights.”51 By the time West’s essay was published six years later, the 
phrase “clear cut” no longer seemed so apt, thanks to the federal 
judiciary. 
That members of the federal bench would give careful scrutiny to 
VAWA was no surprise. In 1991, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States (the official voice of the federal judiciary) formally opposed 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy; Chief Justice Rehnquist remained a vocal 
opponent even after VAWA’s enactment.52 But it was also the case, by 
1994, that doctrine supported the idea of freedom from sexual violence 
as a civil right. Supreme Court precedents recognized that violent and 
harassing sexual conduct could constitute sex discrimination, both for 
 
 49. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40302, 108 Stat. 
1902, 1941–42 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). The Act defines a “crime of violence motivated by gender” to mean “a crime of 
violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an 
animus based on the victim’s gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d), invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598.  
 50. Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence 
Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5, 7 (1996). 
 51. Robin West, Unwelcome Sex: Toward a Harm-Based Analysis, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 138, 138 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
The essays in this collection were originally drafted for a 1998 conference at Yale Law School.  
 52. Judith Resnik, Drafting, Lobbying, and Litigating VAWA: National, Local, and 
Transnational Interventions on Behalf of Women’s Equality, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 557, 559–
83 (2010). For a fuller account of the judiciary’s posture toward this legislation, see STREBEIGH, 
supra note 31, at 352–448 (documenting the resistance from key members of the judiciary, as well 
as the support that VAWA received from women judges).  
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purposes of Title VII (as mentioned in Part I.A)53 and for purposes of 
Title IX.54 These decisions also gave credence to the idea of victims of 
sexual violence staking federal claims in federal court. 
Within just four years of VAWA’s enactment, however, the 
doctrinal landscape had changed in important ways. Although the 
Supreme Court continued to broaden its understanding of the 
behaviors that could constitute illegal sexual harassment,55 a pair of 
decisions in 1998 and 1999 narrowed the circumstances under which a 
student complaining of sexual harassment could sue a school for 
monetary damages. The first case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District,56 involved teacher–student sexual harassment. There, 
the Court held that monetary damages under Title IX were only 
available if an official who had authority to address the alleged 
harassment had “actual knowledge” of it and, in addition, 
demonstrated “deliberate indifference” in responding.57 In the second 
case, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,58 the Court 
extended that holding to complaints of peer-to-peer sexual 
harassment.59 Taken together, these cases suggested that women in 
educational settings did have a right to be free from sexual imposition, 
but also that colleges and universities had little to fear if they failed to 
take that right seriously.60 Indeed, the cases arguably incentivized 
institutions to “bury their heads in the sand” rather than actively 
 
 53. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 54. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). As early as 1977, a federal 
district court had recognized that sexual harassment could be a valid ground for a private action 
against a university under Title IX, see Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4–5 (D. Conn. 
1977), but the Franklin case was the Supreme Court’s first statement on this issue. 
 55. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (holding that 
sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII). 
 56. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 57. Id. at 290. 
 58. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 59. Id. at 643. 
 60. See Anne Lawton, The Emperor’s New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual 
Harassment, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 114 (1999) (noting that, in theory, “Title IX plaintiffs 
still have the right to recover money damages after Gebser,” but that “[a]s a practical matter few, 
if any, Title IX plaintiffs will actually recover such damages under the burdensome standard 
created”); Pamela Y. Price, Eradicating Sexual Harassment in Education, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 51, at 60, 63 (explaining how Gebser and Davis 
“effectively neutralized” Title IX as a weapon in the fight against sexual harassment in education, 
and noting that, “[i]n the wake of Gebser, [she] lost two Title IX cases in short order”). 
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prevent rights violations, lest they accrue the kind of knowledge that 
might trigger liability.61 
Most significant of all was the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
VAWA in United States v. Morrison,62 referenced in the Introduction. 
VAWA’s civil rights remedy was never unproblematic,63 even to its 
proponents, but it was deeply symbolic. Morrison was thus symbolic as 
well. Prior to the decision, MacKinnon went so far as to call the case 
“women’s Civil War”—a war over “women’s full citizenship in the 
federal union.”64 A “wrong” decision would mean going “back to 
fighting things out one at a time” in state court, explained Professor 
Deborah Rhode, where women were highly unlikely to win the rights 
recognition they wanted.65 
A majority of the Court emphasized a different set of stakes, 
sounding in the sanctity and survival of American federalism, and 
concluded that VAWA’s civil rights remedy was unconstitutional.66 
That conclusion required the rejection of two plausible constitutional 
bases for Congress’s authority, the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Under the Court’s recent decision in 
United States v. Lopez,68 a Commerce Clause justification for this 
particular provision required the Court to believe that gender-
 
 61. Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Burying Our Heads in the Sand: Lack of Knowledge, Knowledge 
Avoidance, and the Persistent Problem of Campus Peer Sexual Violence, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 
205, 227, 232–33 (2011). 
 62. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 63. Most obviously, the efficacy of the civil rights remedy depended upon private individuals 
taking the initiative to sue. The remedy itself—monetary damages—also arguably meant nothing 
to a judgment-proof perpetrator. 
 64. Tracey, supra note 3, at 61. 
 65. The specific analogy Rhode invoked was to “fighting the battle against slavery plantation 
by plantation.” Id. This powerful analogy is one more reminder of the deep interconnections 
between battles for women’s rights and battles for racial equality, including feminists’ long and 
complicated history of “reasoning from race.” On the phenomenon of “reasoning from race,” see 
generally MAYERI, supra note 34. On how efforts to combat racial inequality implicated gender 
inequality and vice versa, see generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND 
CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION (1997); ROSEN, supra note 30. 
 66. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601. There are many ways to interpret the majority opinion in 
Morrison. Some of VAWA’s defenders certainly saw gender bias and resistance to the gains of 
feminism. But other Rehnquist Court decisions suggest that the majority’s federalism concerns 
were not disingenuous, or at the very least, that they reflected broader disagreements with liberal 
politics and policymaking. For a useful overview of the Rehnquist Court’s “new federalism,” see 
generally Kathleen L. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism After 
the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 (2006). 
 67. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
 68. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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motivated violence “substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce.”69 
The argument could be made, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion conceded, but it had no logical stopping point70 and thus, if 
accepted, promised to erode the constitutionally mandated distinction 
“between what is truly national and what is truly local.”71 As for the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had expressly invoked in 
enacting VAWA’s civil rights remedy, the majority reaffirmed the 
Court’s commitment to the state action requirement.72 Yes, there was 
arguably state action here, in the form of gender-biased state and local 
law enforcement, but VAWA’s civil rights remedy went well beyond 
remedying this public conduct.73 Taken together, these 
pronouncements left a shell of a statute: VAWA remained standing 
(largely in the form of funding streams for violence prevention, victims’ 
services, and law enforcement),74 but the aspirations at its core had 
received a significant blow. 
C. Rediscovering Rights Through Administrative Regulation? 
In the wake of Gebser, Davis, and Morrison, a flare of resistance 
shot up from one corner of the administrative state—from OCR, an 
agency with jurisdiction over spaces where many women experienced 
sexual violation and where young people of all types internalized the 
 
 69. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).  
 70. Id. at 615–16.  
 71. Id. at 617–18. Scholars would sharply dispute these assertions, especially Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s suggestion that gender-motivated violence was somehow a species of “family law,” 
and that “family law” was a “truly local” matter. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, 
the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 
84–86 (2002) (noting that one rationale for VAWA’s civil rights remedy was the inability of state 
and local governments to address gender-motivated violence—a shortcoming that forty-one 
attorneys general conceded); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the 
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 621 (2001) (showing that “the very areas characterized in the VAWA 
litigation as ‘local’—family life and criminal law—have long been subjected to federal 
lawmaking”). See generally Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of 
Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761 (2004) 
(documenting federal involvement in “domestic relations” in the pre-Civil War era). But the votes 
were on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s side, likely because of broader support among the Justices for 
a reorientation in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence.  
 72. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–24. The Court first articulated the state action requirement 
during Reconstruction, in a set of decisions that many commentators now revile and that some of 
Rehnquist’s brethren seemed eager to overturn.  
 73. Id. at 624–27. 
 74. On VAWA’s post-2000 life, see generally Robin R. Runge, The Evolution of a National 
Response to Violence Against Women, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 429 (2013); Tara McGraw 
Swaminatha, The Violence Against Women Act, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 269 (2004). 
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values and patterns of thought that would guide their adult lives. In 
January of 2001, on the very last day of the Clinton administration, 
OCR issued informal “Revised Guidance” on sexual harassment.75 
Consistent with previous OCR communications, the 2001 
guidance reminded schools that sexual harassment of students could 
constitute sex discrimination and that an institution’s failure to respond 
to sexual harassment (whether by students, school employees, or 
others) could therefore place it in violation of Title IX.76 Breaking new 
ground, however, the 2001 guidance signaled that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Title IX in the private-right-of-action context did not 
govern the agency’s dealings with schools. Had OCR been inclined to 
simply follow the Court’s lead, “actual knowledge” and “deliberate 
indifference” would have become the new watchwords of 
administrative enforcement. The 2001 guidance instead offered twenty 
pages of OCR’s own position on how a school could recognize 
harassment-based sex discrimination and what schools ought to do to 
address it.77 Notably, and in contrast to Gebser and Davis, the 2001 
guidance made clear that a school might receive notice of a sexually 
hostile environment in various ways, including constructively, and that 
“fail[ure] to take immediate and effective corrective action” would 
place a school “in violation of the Title IX regulations.”78 
These strong words attracted little attention at the time, probably 
because OCR seemed unlikely to enforce them.79 In fact, Bush 
appointees to the agency quickly “deep-sixed” the new guidance 
document.80 But the thrust of that document would gain importance 
 
 75. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, 
OR THIRD PARTIES (2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html [https://
perma.cc/NB5W-QJHY]. 
 76. Id. at 5–15. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 14–15.  
 79. On OCR’s weak enforcement record with regard to sexual harassment, see generally 
AAUW LEGAL ADVOCACY FUND, A LICENSE FOR BIAS: SEX DISCRIMINATION, SCHOOLS, AND 
TITLE IX (2000); Julie Davies, Assessing Institutional Responsibility for Sexual Harassment in 
Education, 77 TUL. L. REV. 387, 436–38 (2002). 
 80. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., SLIP-SLIDING AWAY: THE EROSION OF HARD-WON 
GAINS FOR WOMEN UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND AN AGENDA FOR MOVING 
FORWARD 17 (2004). Critics interpreted the decision to shelve the 2001 guidance as evidence of 
hostility toward civil rights, and women’s civil rights in particular. Id. C. Todd Jones, a former 
Bush administration OCR official, has attributed that decision instead to concerns about faulty 
process—specifically, failure to provide “an adequate public comment period”—and “legal 
analysis errors.” CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: A FRUSTRATING 
TANI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2017  1:32 PM 
2017]     RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1865 
over the following years, as victims of sexual harassment and sexual 
violence became aware of their rights under existing federal laws and 
more pessimistic about any kind of legislative replacement for what 
was lost in Morrison.81 The 2001 guidance became a reminder that 
OCR had jurisdiction over the issue of sexual violence and that, with 
respect to the other branches of the federal government, it might be 
willing to go its own way.82 
Understanding why OCR did ultimately go its own way requires 
piecing together what happened in the early 2000s. Three 
developments stand out. First, this was an era of high-profile sexual 
assault scandals, many involving college-age women victims. 
Professional basketball star Kobe Bryant, for example, made news for 
this reason,83 as did the University of Colorado Boulder football 
program84 and the U.S. Air Force Academy.85 National media coverage 
of these and similar scandals shined a light on the general lack of legal 
consequences—civil or criminal—for those accused of wrongdoing, as 
well as the role of colleges and universities in shielding wrongdoers.86 
Second, this was a time of continuing and dramatic public 
disinvestment from higher education, even as demand for higher 
education grew; those trends affected the messages that students 
 
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 82 (2010), https://cloudfront-files-1.publicintegrity.org/documents/pdfs/
Sexual%20Assault%20on%20Campus.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NSK-YQRM]. For the record, 
OCR did not ignore complaints of sexual violence during the Bush administration. For example, 
in 2002, OCR investigated Harvard University over a sexual assault policy that allegedly 
discouraged victims from reporting. But, notably, the agency found no Title IX violation. Eric 
Hoover, Harvard’s Sexual-Assault Policy Does Not Violate Students’ Rights, U.S. Inquiry 
Concludes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 3, 2003), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Harvards-
Sexual-Assault/110446 [https://perma.cc/4RSJ-QWHG].  
 81. Cf. Melnick, supra note 14, at 39 (noting that “OCR’s 2001 abandonment of the standard 
tort/liability regulatory approach made it easier for the agency to move from the individual 
malfeasor to the inequality/subordination understanding of the underlying problem”—the 
understanding that undergirds OCR’s post-2011 enforcement campaign).  
 82. This observation draws on the work of political scientist R. Shep Melnick, who has 
characterized Gebser, Davis, and the 2001 guidance as a break from the collaborative 
“leapfrogging” approach taken by civil rights agencies and federal courts in the previous decades. 
Id. at 9–11. 
 83. See Jeff Benedict, Athletes and Accusations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at A15; Tom Weir 
& Erik Brady, In Sexual Assault Cases, Athletes Usually Cleared; Conviction Rate Much Lower 
Than Other Defendants, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 2003, at A01.  
 84. David Wharton, David Kelly & Chris Dufresne, University of Colorado Is a Study in 
Sports Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at A1. 
 85. Michael Janofsky & Diana Jean Schemo, Women Recount Life as Cadets: Forced Sex, 
Fear and Silent Rage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at N1. 
 86. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 83, at A15; Weir & Brady, supra note 83, at A01; Wharton, 
Kelly & Dufresne, supra note 84, at A1. 
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received. As for-profit models of higher education rose to the fore and 
tuition costs rose, students heard themselves described as private 
consumers of a market commodity, not recipients of a public benefit.87 
Moreover, according to this new model, the good they were purchasing 
extended well beyond educational content to include a safe 
environment, a positive experience, and a supportive community. The 
result, post-Morrison, was a landscape in which freedom from sexual 
violence was not a national civil right—and yet for college students, 
such freedom was hardly an illegitimate expectation. 
Third, the early 2000s saw the nonprofit watchdog Security on 
Campus, Inc. (SOC) come of age, succeeding as never before in 
connecting isolated incidents of campus sexual assault to the 
guarantees and protections of federal law. SOC was founded in 1987 
by the family of college student Jeanne Clery, whose rape and murder 
led to the enactment of the campus crime reporting mandate known as 
the Clery Act. A decade into the group’s existence, SOC was making a 
name for itself by vigilantly monitoring college and university 
newspapers, and when it caught wind of campus crime, demanding 
compliance with the Clery Act’s underenforced disclosure 
requirements. In 2001, for example, SOC stood by the side of William 
and Mary student Samantha Collins after the college shut down her 
efforts to publicize an alleged rape at a campus fraternity party.88 In 
2002, SOC was in the news again, highlighting sexual assault reporting 
flaws at Moravian College in Pennsylvania89 and Saint Mary’s College 
 
 87. See generally MICHAEL FABRICANT & STEPHEN BRIER, AUSTERITY BLUES: FIGHTING 
FOR THE SOUL OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION (2016) (charting the decline in public investment 
in higher education since the 1980s and the rise of privatization and other for-profit approaches 
to education); Rudy Fichtenbaum, The Crisis is Real, EUROPEAN (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/rudy-fichtenbaum/9691-higher-education-crisis-causes-
and-solutions [https://perma.cc/BAE5-6RDV] (noting that the pace of public defunding 
accelerated after 2000); STARVING THE BEAST: THE BATTLE TO DISRUPT AND REFORM 
AMERICA’S PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES (Violet Crown Films, 2016) (documenting the defunding of 
public higher education over the past thirty-five years and the rise of market-oriented reforms).  
 88. Brian Whitson, W&M Rape Victim Refuses to Hide, DAILY PRESS (Newport, Va.), Aug. 
4, 2003, at C1. SOC was also in the news that year for its activism at Penn State University and 
Duke University. See Kevin Lees, Education Department Answers Duke Student’s Complaint, 
CHRON. (June 21, 2001), http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2001/06/education-department-
answers-student-complaint [https://perma.cc/6UYY-ME6L] (reporting that in 2001 SOC filed a 
Clery Act complaint against Duke University on behalf of a recent graduate who claimed sexual 
assault by a peer); Angela Pomponio, Penn State Urged to Expel Criminal, CENTRE DAILY TIMES 
(State College, Pa.), Nov. 28, 2001, at 1A (reporting that in the wake of the criminal prosecution 
of a former Penn State wrestler for sexual assault, SOC joined activists in demanding that the 
university take stronger measures to respond to sexual assault on campus). 
 89. Genevieve Marshall, Group Faults Timing of Report on Rape, MORNING CALL (Apr.  
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of California.90 In the Saint Mary’s case, SOC even filed a formal 
complaint with the DOE.91 The following year, it shifted its attention 
to Florida State University,92 Columbus State University,93 and 
Georgetown University.94  
The Georgetown incident is particularly significant. It began with 
a sexual assault allegation that student Kate Deiringer leveled against 
a fellow student.95 Following a campus disciplinary proceeding and a 
finding of wrongdoing, Georgetown initially expelled the other student 
(an upperclassman whom Deiringer accused of drugging and raping 
her mere weeks into her freshman year). Deiringer was outraged to 
learn that university officials later reduced the sanctions to a one-year 
suspension, and that according to the nondisclosure policy 
Georgetown had her sign, she could not discuss the proceedings or 
reveal her assailant’s identity. Ultimately, she spoke out anyway. Not 
long thereafter, SOC Vice President S. Daniel Carter reached out to 
inform her that although Georgetown’s nondisclosure policy did have 




 90. Paul T. Rosynsky, College Faces Violation Charges, ARGUS (Fremont-Newark, Cal.), 
Nov. 27, 2002, at A1; Carrie Sturrock, St. Mary’s Complaints Not Unique, CONTRA COSTA TIMES 
(Walnut Creek, Cal.), Nov. 27, 2002, at A01.  
 91. Rosynsky, supra note 90, at A1; Sturrock, supra note 90, at A1. 
 92. Donna Koehn & David Wasson, FSU Case Puts Spotlight on Rape Report Policies, 
TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 22, 2003, at 1. 
 93. Jim Houston, Storm Brews over Rape Report, LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Columbus, Ga.), 
Nov. 14, 2003, at A1. 
 94. Juhie Bhatia, Georgetown Ruling Breaks Silence on Campus Rape, WOMEN’S ENEWS 
(Sept. 7, 2004), http://womensenews.org/2004/09/georgetown-ruling-breaks-silence-campus-rape 
[https://perma.cc/VT2D-Q5EA]. SOC’s activism continued throughout the 2000s. For example, 
in 2004, after author Naomi Wolf and journalist Emily Bazelon publicized Yale University’s 
inattention to complaints of sexual harassment and sexual violence, SOC filed an official 
complaint about Yale with the DOE. See Emily Bazelon, Lux, Veritas, and Sexual Trespass, YALE 
ALUMNI MAG. (July/Aug. 2004), https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3719-updates [https://
perma.cc/7VKA-5U5U]; Kim Martineau, Reports of Sex Crimes at Yale Are Up, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Nov. 1, 2004, at B1; Naomi Wolf, The Silent Treatment, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 1, 2004), 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/n_9932 [https://perma.cc/R4UJ-RN79]. In 2004, SOC 
also reportedly filed a complaint on behalf of victims of rape at the University of Virginia. 
Cantalupo, supra note 61, at 264 n.236. In 2006, SOC’s S. Daniel Carter was the one to inform 
University of Wisconsin–Madison student Laura Dunn of her rights under Title IX. CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 80, at 76. Dunn has gone on to become a lawyer and a prominent 
advocate for survivors of sexual assault. 
 95. How One Student Changed Georgetown’s Sexual Assault Policy, GEO. VOICE (Sept. 16, 
2014), http://georgetownvoice.com/2004/09/16/how-one-student-changed-georgetowns-sexual-
assault-policy [https://perma.cc/LG7W-7F49]. 
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Privacy Act, the Clery Act required colleges and universities to keep 
students apprised of criminal activity on and around campus—
including, in this case, Deiringer’s alleged rape.96 Deiringer filed 
official complaints with the DOE under both the Clery Act and Title 
IX.97 
The case resulted in two important statements from OCR, albeit 
ones that lacked the finality of a formal adjudication or binding 
rulemaking. First, in response to the Clery Act complaint, OCR ruled 
that Georgetown could not require victims to sign nondisclosure 
agreements, even if this practice was a good-faith effort to comply with 
federal privacy protections.98 In other words, OCR reminded 
institutions that accused students were not the only ones with federally 
protected rights. Second, in response to the Title IX complaint, OCR 
offered a glimpse of the potential reach of its powers. In fact, one of 
the demands it made of Georgetown, as a condition of resolving the 
complaint, was the very one that critics today find most concerning: a 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard for sexual assault 
adjudications (as opposed to a higher standard, such as “clear and 
convincing” evidence).99 OCR’s resolution agreement became public—
SOC made sure of that—and other colleges took note.100 
No rash of OCR investigations followed in the wake of the 
Georgetown resolution, and many of the investigations that did emerge 
were disappointing, at least to those who hoped to see OCR assume a 
more forceful role. Subsequent Freedom of Information Act requests 
would reveal that between 1998 and 2008, the agency resolved only 
 
 96. See id. 
 97. Id.; see BRETT A. SOKOLOW, INSIDE AN OCR TITLE IX INVESTIGATION 2, 
https://www.ncherm.org/pdfs/INSIDE_TITLE_IX_INVESTIGATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7
V4-DNYJ].  
 98. SOKOLOW, supra note 97, at 1. 
 99. Id. at 3. For critiques of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, see infra note 177. 
In general, critics fear that a “more likely than not” standard is not protective enough of the 
accused for a charge that may result in significant consequences for the accused’s reputation and 
life prospects.  
 100. See SOKOLOW, supra note 97, at 1; Lauren Sieben, Education Dept. Issues New 
Guidance for Sexual-Assault Investigations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), http://
www.chronicle.com/article/Education-Dept-Issues-New/127004 [https://perma.cc/ED5A-23DE]. 
But see Cantalupo, supra note 61, at 26 (noting that as late as 2009, college administrators were 
citing the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act as a reason for requiring victims to sign 
nondisclosure agreements). OCR also required a preponderance standard in 1995, in a settlement 
agreement with Evergreen State College. See Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault 
Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1986 n.255 (2016). But unlike with 
Georgetown, the Evergreen State agreement was not widely publicized. 
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twenty-four investigations into the handling of sexual assault on college 
campuses.101 Those twenty-four investigations resulted in findings of 
violations in just five cases, and in no instance did the agency 
administer punishment, even when investigators concluded that 
campus officials retaliated against students who reported assault.102 
Nonetheless, students, legal advocates, and academics were 
becoming more aware of the administrative avenue and its possibilities. 
One indication is a 2007 Harvard Law School conference on Title IX, 
which included prominent gender violence expert Diane Rosenfeld. 
Rosenfeld had formerly served as Senior Counsel to the DOJ’s Office 
on Violence Against Women and had since moved into advocacy and 
law teaching. Part of her teaching portfolio was a seminar at Harvard 
Law School on Title IX; informally, she advised student groups seeking 
to convince the Harvard administration to take the issue of sexual 
assault more seriously.103 Several years later, Rosenfeld would serve as 
a consultant to OCR when it drafted the 2011 DCL104—a turn of events 
that might have surprised her in 2007, given OCR’s disappointing track 
record. What she could and did say at that earlier date was that, at a 
minimum, a Title IX complaint to OCR was a “more accessible” 
avenue “than private litigation” for a victim of sexual assault on 
campus; used strategically and systematically, such complaints could be 
“a great way to force a change.”105 (Prior to the release of the 2011 
 
 101. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 80, at 74. For more on the results of individual 
investigations, see id. at 77–78, 80–81. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Interview with Diane Rosenfeld (CTR. FOR WOMEN IN TRANSITION), Summer 2015, 
at 1, https://cwitmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Summer15-newsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D7WV-979K]. 
 104. Rosenfeld Consults on Federal Effort Targeting Sexual Assaults at Colleges, HARV. 
L. TODAY (Aug. 29, 2011), https://today.law.harvard.edu/rosenfeld-consults-on-federal-effort-
targeting-sexual-assaults-at-colleges [https://perma.cc/TC5X-M8NT]. 
 105. Comments from the Spring 2007 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender Conference, 31 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 378, 381 (2008); see also id. at 384 (summary of remarks by Holly Hogan) 
(describing the OCR complaint process as an avenue that victims and activists ought to use more). 
This is not to say that advocates and victims had abandoned private lawsuits—to the contrary. See 
Aisha Sultan, Plaintiffs Are Using Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 10, 2002, at C4. Risk-management professionals went so far as to describe a 
“boom” in sexual-misconduct-based civil suits against colleges and universities in the 2000s. John 
L. Pulley, Risk-Management Lawyer Says Boom in Sexual-Harassment Lawsuits Should Make 
Colleges Handle Cases Carefully, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2005), http://www.
chronicle.com/article/Risk-Management-Lawyer-Says/120170 [https://perma.cc/N68Q-CSUB]. 
But see LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC 
CIVIL RIGHTS 82 (2016) (noting that in the workplace discrimination context, compliance 
professionals tend to “characterize the legal landscape as favorable to employees” and to flag 
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DCL, she would go on to test this theory, when she advised the lead 
complainant in a highly publicized Title IX complaint against Yale 
University.106) 
Forcing change would have been beside the point, of course, if 
people on the ground perceived the problem as discrete and local—a 
matter of individual “bad apples.” But that was not the case. By the 
mid-2000s, activists on campuses were portraying sexual assault as the 
kind of problem that ought to command the attention of national 
policymakers and administrators. In their framing, sexual violence was 
a society-wide “epidemic.”107 Popularizing a term that anthropologist 
Peggy Sanday coined decades earlier,108 they blamed not only 
 
“high-profile multimillion-dollar class action settlements,” even though “employers prevail in the 
vast majority of cases”). However, both Title IX doctrine and state-level tort law continued to 
pose significant hurdles for plaintiffs. In egregious cases, colleges and universities settled; other 
cases failed. See generally LEWIS, SCHUSTER & SOKOLOW, supra note 8 (discussing high-profile 
settlements from this era). And regardless of the outcome, litigation seemed unlikely to effect 
systemic change. See Cantalupo, supra note 61, at 235 (noting that when it comes to changing 
institutional behavior, “a private suit for damages at best will only make such changes indirectly”). 
 106. See Christina Huffington, Yale Students File Title IX Complaint Against University, YALE 
HERALD (Mar. 31, 2011), http://yaleherald.com/homepage-lead-image/cover-stories/breaking-
news-yale-students-file-title-ix-suit-against-school [https://perma.cc/S27D-BCGD] (interviewing 
several of the complainants and describing some of the incidents that formed the basis for the 
Title IX complaint against Yale); Diane L. Rosenfeld, Uncomfortable Conversations: Confronting 
the Reality of Target Rape on Campus, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 359, 362 n.13 (2015) (disclosing that 
Rosenfeld represented Alexandra Brodsky, the lead complainant in the case). Another advocate 
who pushed for greater utilization of Title IX in the early and mid-2000s was prosecutor-turned-
professor Wendy J. Murphy. In 2002, she filed an OCR complaint against Harvard University, 
over a policy that demanded “sufficient independent corroboration” from students alleging sexual 
assault. Cynthia L. Cooper, Women Lawyers Spur a Call to Action on Campus Sexual Assault, 22 
PERSPECTIVES 8, 14 (2014). 
 107. See, e.g., Akilah Imani Nelson, Shippensburg, PUB. OPINION (Chambersburg, Pa.), Apr. 
2, 2004, at 3A; Renée Petrina, Students Rally Against Assault, COLLEGIAN (Apr. 19, 2001), 
http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archives/article_d3246874-bd6b-5d50-ac29-b2392ccfd810.html 
[https://perma.cc/F4PQ-EA4T]; Bryan Proffitt, No Means Know, TECHNICIAN (Raleigh), Oct. 23, 
2000, https://global.factiva.com/factivalogin/login.asp?productname=global [https://perma.cc/
8779-BJFW]; Megan H. Scott, Safety Issues Addressed, CRUSADER U., Feb. 11, 2000, at 1; Carrie 
Sturrock, Rape Reporting Policy Is Caring, Helps Raise Student Awareness, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13, 
2007, at B1; Amanda McGrath, Week of Take Back the Night Events Begins, HOYA (Nov. 6, 2001), 
http://www.thehoya.com/week-of-take-back-the-night-events-begins [https://perma.cc/7YW9-33
TB]. 
 108. Patricia Yancey Martin, The Rape Prone Culture of Academic Contexts: Fraternities and 
Athletics, 30 GENDER & SOC. 30, 33 n.3 (2016). See generally PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, 
FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX, BROTHERHOOD, AND PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS (1990) 
(discussing the sociocultural context of rape); Peggy Reeves Sanday, The Socio-Cultural Context 
of Rape: A Cross-Cultural Study, 37 J. SOC. ISSUES 5 (1981) (same). 
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individual perpetrators, but also a broader “rape culture.”109 This was 
a theme, for example, of Rosenfeld’s various classes and speaking 
engagements, including a 2005 lecture at the University of Wisconsin 
Law School (her alma mater). After showing a documentary on the 
normalization of rape in American culture, Rosenfeld offered her 
audience a MacKinnon-esque take on the relationship between sexual 
violence and citizenship: “Rape is a denial of [women’s] equal 
citizenship status.”110 In short, years after Morrison, the concerns that 
animated VAWA had not gone away, nor had the desire for a national, 
civil rights-based solution—at least when it came to women on campus. 
D. Administrative Enforcement of the Right To Be Free from Sexual 
Violence 
By 2009, the legal and political landscape had changed in several 
important ways. The presidency was in the hands of Democrat Barack 
Obama; his vice president was none other than Senator Biden, a 
moving force behind VAWA. Strong signals emanated from the White 
House about women’s right to be free from sexual violence. Within his 
first 100 days, President Obama proclaimed April to be “Sexual 
Assault Awareness Month.”111 Six months into assuming office, he had 
appointed a White House advisor on violence against women, Lynn 
Rosenthal.112 And by September of that year, the administration had 
 
 109. Kathy Redmond, founder of the National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, was 
particularly vocal in her use of the term “rape culture.” See Advocate: “Rape Culture” Exists at 
University of Colorado, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 2004, at 59; Bob Cohn, Athletic Advantage? 
Sports Stars Have Winning Record in Court, WASH. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at C01; Stan Grossfield, 
“Nobody Is Going to Do This on My Watch” – Anger Drives Victim to Help Women Attacked by 
Athletes, BOS. GLOBE (June 20, 2004), http://archive.boston.com/sports/other_sports/articles/
2004/06/16/a_voice_for_the_victims [https://perma.cc/QG3W-NMNN]. Other campus activists 
also began employing the term during these years. See, e.g., Mary Butler, Campus Culture 
Questioned, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder, Colo.), Feb. 29, 2004, at A1; Laura Crimaldi, Harvard 
Women: No Doggs Allowed!, BOS. HERALD, Apr. 14, 2005, at 5; Eric Ferreri, Playboy Draws 
Protest, Interest, CHAPEL HILL HERALD (N.C.), Apr. 6, 2004, at 1; Gregory Phillips, Sex Draws 
Most Focus at NCCU Forum, HERALD-SUN (N.C.), Oct. 11, 2006, at C1.  
 110. Shira Nanus, U. Wisconsin: ‘Rape Culture’ Persists, U. Wisconsin Alumna Says, U. WIRE, 
Oct. 21, 2005, https://global.factiva.com/factivalogin/login.asp?productname=global [https://
perma.cc/8779-BJFW]. 
 111. Amanda Cuda, Sexual Assault Awareness Could Get Boost, NEWS-TIMES (Danbury, 
Conn.) (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.newstimes.com/news/article/Sexual-assault-awareness-could-
get-boost-119906.php [https://perma.cc/3WMN-HDZQ].  
 112. Christine Simmons, White House Appoints Domestic Violence Adviser, BOSTON.COM 
(June 26, 2009), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/06/26/obama_
appoints_domestic_violence_adviser [https://perma.cc/R89R-SZ23]. 
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created a White House Council on Women and Girls, to “ensure that 
American women are treated fairly in all matters of public policy.”113 
September 2009 also marked VAWA’s fifteenth anniversary, 
which Vice President Biden celebrated with an event at his home.114 
But Biden’s interest in combatting violence against women was not 
merely retrospective. Indeed, he seemed to perceive the situation much 
like fellow VAWA supporter Judith Resnik—as “in media res, in the 
middle of the story.”115 Rosenthal recalls that one of her first 
assignments that year—received from Biden himself—was “to look at 
all the data about violence against women and girls” and see what, if 
anything, had changed since VAWA’s enactment in 1994.116 Rosenthal 
did, and reported that women in the sixteen-to-twenty-four age bracket 
appeared particularly vulnerable.117 This demographic corresponded 
nicely with a pocket of federal jurisdiction. As Senator Claire 
McCaskill has shrewdly noted, “The federal government has no 
jurisdiction over rape. . . . But it has jurisdiction over campus sexual 
assault via Title IX.”118 
Another crucial development around 2009 was the interest of the 
Center for Public Integrity (CPI), a nonprofit investigative reporting 
organization “famous for digging up dirt on influence-peddling and 
corruption.”119 As CPI reporters turned their attention to the issue of 
sexual assault on college campuses, they initially focused on the actions 
and inactions of colleges and universities, including lack of 
 
 113. Mimi Hall, Administration Pushes Women’s Issues to Fore, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2009, 
at A4. 
 114. Christine Simmons, Biden Commemorates Violence Against Women Act, NEWSDAY 
(Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/biden-commemorates-violence-against-
women-act-1.1486928 [https://perma.cc/35X4-AAX8]. 
 115. Resnik, supra note 52, at 569. 
 116. Richard Dorment, Occidental Justice: The Disastrous Fallout When Drunk Sex Meets 
Academic Bureaucracy, ESQUIRE (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a33751/
occidental-justice-case [https://perma.cc/P8BU-CX39].  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Mariah Blake, Something Fishy?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July/Aug. 2012), 
http://www.cjr.org/feature/something_fishy.php [https://perma.cc/53JH-BZVW]. On the timeline 
of CPI’s investigation and how it unfolded, see Sexual Assault on Campus: About This Project, 
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/8932/about-project 
[https://perma.cc/CD8B-82LL]. 
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transparency,120 underreporting,121 inattention to repeat offenders,122 
and failure to impose meaningful consequences for sexual assault123—
the kind of institutional behavior that journalists had exposed in recent 
investigations of the Catholic Church.124 By early 2010, however, CPI 
had zeroed in on “lax enforcement of Title IX” as perhaps the most 
significant factor contributing to continuing sexual assault on college 
campuses. Bluntly, OCR was a “feeble watchdog.”125 Prominent 
national media outlets, such as National Public Radio, further 
publicized CPI’s findings.126 
The result was a public response from OCR’s new head, Obama 
appointee Russlynn Ali. In communications with CPI, Ali agreed with 
activists that sexual violence in schools had become an “epidemic” and 
 
 120. Kristen Lombardi, Sexual Assault on Campus Shrouded in Secrecy, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Dec. 1, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2009/12/01/9047/sexual-
assault-campus-shrouded-secrecy [https://perma.cc/JJH4-G998]. 
 121. Kristen Lombardi, Campus Sexual Assault Statistics Don’t Add Up, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Dec. 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2009/12/02/9045/campus-
sexual-assault-statistics-don-t-add [https://perma.cc/3K8H-GD78]; see also Kristin Jones, Barriers 
Curb Reporting on Campus Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Dec. 2, 2009, 11:02 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2009/12/02/9046/barriers-curb-reporting-campus-sexual-assault 
[https://perma.cc/29ZP-BD4S] (discussing the barriers that impede reporting of sexual assault on 
campuses). 
 122. Jennifer Peebles & Kristen Lombardi, ‘Undetected Rapists’ on Campus: A Troubling 
Plague of Repeat Offenders, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 26, 2010, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/26/4404/undetected-rapists-campus-troubling-plague-
repeat-offenders [https://perma.cc/VRD7-ZBU5]. 
 123. Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:00 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-
consequences-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/4SJQ-7JB8].  
 124. CPI reporter Kristen Lombardi, then with the Boston Phoenix, was one of the reporters 
who originally broke this story. Subsequent investigations garnered a Pulitzer Prize for reporters 
at the Boston Globe. Kyle Scott Clauss, Out of the Spotlight: Does the Phoenix Deserve Credit for 
the Globe’s Scoop?, BOS. MAG. (Oct. 30, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/
news/blog/2015/10/30/phoenix-globe-spotlight [https://perma.cc/VY3T-7YCL]. 
 125. Kristin Jones, Lax Enforcement of Title IX in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:00 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/ 
25/4374/lax-enforcement-title-ix-campus-sexual-assault-cases-0 [https://perma.cc/52MG-UPV4]. 
CPI compiled this article and others into one large digital report. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, 
supra note 80, at 4–5. By 2010, OCR was no stranger to allegations of lax enforcement of Title 
IX, but previous critiques had focused mostly on athletics. 
 126. In collaboration with CPI, National Public Radio ran a special series of articles on this 
issue. Seeking Justice for Campus Rapes, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, http://www.npr.org/series/
124073905/seeking-justice-for-campus-rapes [https://perma.cc/3ER4-EEG7]. The series gained 
additional attention when it won the prestigious Peabody Award for excellence in broadcasting. 
Seeking Justice for Campus Rapes, PEABODY AWARDS, http://www.peabodyawards.com/award-
profile/seeking-justice-for-campus-rapes [https://perma.cc/4WT5-S338]. 
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she committed her agency to doing better.127 Ali was in fact already 
alert to the issue,128 but the exchange with CPI signaled her intentions 
going forward: “[W]here universities . . . don’t comply with civil rights 
laws” and prove “unwilling to look to find a resolution,” Ali told CPI, 
OCR would use “all of the tools at [its] disposal . . . to ensure that 
women are free from sexual violence.”129 “[W]e are a rubber stamp for 
no one,” Ali insisted.130 
In April of 2011, OCR issued its now-famous Dear Colleague 
Letter. This guidance document differed from its predecessors in its 
explicit focus on sexual violence, which it defined to include rape, 
sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion.131 In keeping with 
longer-term trends in progressive rape law reform, this definition 
foregrounded the value of sexual autonomy and rejected physical force 
as the dividing line between cognizable and noncognizable sexual 
violence.132 The 2011 DCL also demanded more of colleges and 
universities than previous guidance documents. It took an expansive 
view of colleges’ and universities’ jurisdiction, noting that “off-
campus” conduct by members of the community could very well affect 
a student’s learning environment on campus.133 It clarified the duties of 
the campus “Title IX coordinator,” a compliance officer whose 
existence had long been mandated but whose qualifications and precise 
 
 127. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 80, at 84. On the influence of CPI’s reporting on 
OCR, see also Kristen Lombardi, Continuing Impact from Center Series, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Apr. 7, 2010, 5:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/04/07/2702/continuing-
impact-center-series [https://perma.cc/3VYJ-8PBZ].  
 128. See Joey Seiler, Women’s Law Association Conference to Take Interdisciplinary Look at 
Equality, HARV. L. RECORD (Jan. 31, 2011) http://hlrecord.org/2011/01/womens-law-association-
conference-to-take-interdisciplinary-look-at-equality [https://perma.cc/2GM3-STHV] (reporting 
that Ali attended Diane Rosenfeld’s Title IX seminar at Harvard Law School in 2009 and that the 
two women “collaborated to raise awareness of schools’ roles in preventing sexual violence on 
campus”); Robin Wilson, How a 20-Page Letter Changed the Way Higher Education Handles 
Sexual Assault, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-a-
20-Page-Letter-Changed/239141 [https://perma.cc/K9FZ-9CLZ] (noting that early in her tenure 
at OCR, Ali expressed concern about sexual violence in the nation’s schools). 
 129. CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 80, at 75; see also id. at 78 (“Where there is 
recalcitrance . . . we will aggressively enforce.”). 
 130. Id. at 84; see also Kristen Galles, Title IX and the Importance of a Reinvigorated OCR, 
HUMAN RIGHTS MAG. (Summer 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_
magazine_home/human_rights_vol37_2010/summer2010/title_ix_and_the_importance_of_a_rein
vigorated_ocr.html [https://perma.cc/M4MT-SY56] (documenting Ali’s assurances of a 
“reinvigorated OCR”). 
 131. 2011 DCL, supra note 15, at 1–2.  
 132. For more information on these trends, see Anderson, supra note 100, at 1950–53.  
 133. 2011 DCL, supra note 15, at 4.  
TANI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/8/2017  1:32 PM 
2017]     RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1875 
role had never been spelled out in such explicit terms.134 And it 
required a number of measures that some observers have interpreted 
as procomplainant (and others have interpreted as a balancing of the 
scales), such as protective measures for students during the processing 
of complaints and a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof 
for adjudicatory hearings (rather than the higher standards that some 
institutions had been using).135 Last, but not least, the document 
recommended numerous “proactive measures” that schools should 
take to train and educate community members.136 
In a subsequent wave of investigations, OCR made clear that the 
2011 DCL meant what it said and more.137 Responding to formal 
complaints and sometimes opening investigations on its own initiative, 
OCR officials descended on dozens of schools.138 No institution was 
presumptively secure. Targets of investigation ranged from obscure 
community colleges to highly specialized professional schools to the 
tip-top of the Ivy League. Formal resolution agreements appeared on 
OCR’s website, signaling to other institutions the kind of responses 
that the agency wished to see.139 
A robust grassroots movement developed alongside these 
efforts.140 This movement built on a decades-long tradition of Take 
 
 134. Id. at 7–8. 
 135. Id. at 11. Another example: the 2011 DCL “strongly discourages” allowing an alleged 
perpetrator to personally question or cross-examine the complainant. Id. at 12.  
 136. Id. at 14. 
 137. Molly Redden, U. of Notre Dame to Clarify Sexual-Harassment Policy in Settlement with 
Education Department, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 1, 2011), http://www.chronicle.com/article/
U-of-Notre-Dame-to-Clarify/128128 [https://perma.cc/79P9-8ZL2] (describing OCR’s July 2011 
settlement with the University of Notre Dame as a signal of how it intended to enforce the 2011 
DCL). 
 138. See Sara Lipka, Colleges Consider a New ‘Blueprint’ for Responding to Sexual Assault, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 24, 2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Consider-a-
New/140503 [https://perma.cc/GRB7-25Z5] (reporting that as of July 2013, the DOE was 
“investigating sexual misconduct at more than two dozen colleges under Title IX”); Redden, 
supra note 137 (noting OCR’s willingness to open investigations on its own initiative, as well as 
respond to formal complaints); Libby Sander, Quiet No Longer, Rape Survivors Put Pressure on 
Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Quiet-No-
Longer-Rape/141049 [https://perma.cc/L4BM-HKV2] (“In a written statement to The Chronicle, 
the department [DOE] says that it has initiated a ‘record number’ of proactive investigations, and 
that agreements with colleges have included ‘robust, far-reaching remedies.’”). 
 139. See generally Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, supra note 17 (compiling 
data on the targets, timing, and resolution of OCR’s investigations since 2011). 
 140. Tyler Kingkade, College Sexual Assault Survivors Form Underground Network to 
Reform Campus Policies, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/college-sexual-assault-survivors_n_2918855.html [https://
perma.cc/A46P-BBPR]. 
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Back the Night rallies, but its target audience extended all the way to 
Washington and it employed tools beyond campus consciousness-
raising.141 End Rape on Campus (EROC) and Know Your IX (KYIX), 
two of the most prominent institutions to emerge, are representative. 
The individual founders of these organizations had experienced sexual 
violation by a peer, followed by unsympathetic treatment by campus 
bureaucracy.142 Both organizations have articulated bold aspirations 
and deployed Title IX as a primary vehicle.143 And by 2013, they were 
grabbing national headlines—not only for organizing rallies, but also 
for petitioning the DOE for stricter enforcement and assisting 
“survivors” in filing formal civil rights complaints.144  
This movement appears to have helped inspire a further uptick in 
complaints and investigations after 2014.145 So, too, did President 
Obama’s pledge to develop a “coordinated Federal response” to the 
issue of campus sexual assault.146 Around that time, OCR raised the 
stakes even higher for colleges and universities by publishing the 
names of institutions under investigation.147 In the words of OCR’s new 
 
 141. Sander, supra note 138. 
 142. See Dana Bolger, Sexual Assault Survivor Activists Launch ‘Know Your IX’ Campaign, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-bolger/sexual-
assault-survivor-a_b_3104714.html [https://perma.cc/H82S-QJD7]. 
 143. About KYIX, KNOW YOUR IX, http://knowyourix.org/about-ky9 [https://perma.cc/
L7SM-3AHA]; About Us, END RAPE ON CAMPUS, http://endrapeoncampus.org/our-team-1 
[https://perma.cc/2EKW-BWF4].  
 144. Kathleen Megan, Support of the Online Sort, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 27, 2013 at A1; 
Sara Lipka, Protesters Call for Stricter Sanctions on Colleges that Mishandle Sexual Assault, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 16, 2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Protesters-Call-for-
Stricter/140375 [https://perma.cc/8Z7D-JNLW]; Jonah Newman & Libby Sander, Promise 
Unfulfilled?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Promise-
Unfulfilled-/146299 [https://perma.cc/9BUL-ZBHM]. On the significance of using the term 
“survivor,” rather than “victim,” see Parul Sehgal, The Forced Heroism of the ‘Survivor,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/the-forced-heroism-of-the-
survivor.html [https://perma.cc/4GD4-NB5C].  
 145. See generally Rachel Axon, Colleges Under Fire for Handling of Sexual Assault, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 24, 2014, 8:18 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/04/24/
sexual-assault-colleges-jameis-winston-president-obama/8122831 [https://perma.cc/6AWT-UN
BX].  
 146. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Memorandum – Establishing a 
White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault (Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/memorandum-establishing-white-house-task-force-
protect-students-sexual-a [https://perma.cc/8FH7-2JP7].  
 147. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Releases List of 
Higher Education Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-
institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations [https://perma.cc/BG42-D6UB]. 
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head, Catherine Lhamon, educators needed “to radically change [the] 
message” they sent to students who experienced sexual assault.148 
Should those educators fail, Lhamon warned, she would “go to 
enforcement” and was “prepared to withhold federal funds.”149 
Between the issuance of the 2011 DCL and the date of this Article, 
OCR has resolved sixty-two cases, most through resolution 
agreements; investigations into 327 colleges and universities remain 
open.150 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the 2011–16 era, at least for 
the purposes of this Article, is the way that some activists and 
advocates have chosen to engage with OCR and their capacious 
framing of the agency’s work.151 “Our goal is to show that there is a 
pervasive culture of sexual assault which needs to be addressed on a 
national level,” explained EROC cofounder and Title IX activist 
Annie Clark in 2013.152 Clark has also connected her organization’s 
work to a broader “movement to end gender-based violence.”153 KYIX 
cofounder Alexandra Brodsky (the lead complainant in the 2011 
complaint against Yale) has described her organization’s work in 
 
 148. Libby Sander, Colleges Are Reminded of Federal Eye on Handling of Sexual-Assault 
Cases, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Are-
Reminded-of/144703 [https://perma.cc/NL3E-P8MK].  
 149. How Campus Sexual Assaults Came to Command New Attention, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Aug. 12, 2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/12/339822696/how-campus-sexual-assaults-
came-to-command-new-attention [https://perma.cc/8DT6-WXVG].  
 150. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, supra note 17. 
 151. This Article does not advance an argument about how OCR officials themselves have 
understood their work. Without additional research the most that can be said is that, in formal 
communications, top OCR officials have consistently tied their enforcement efforts to their 
statutory mandate under Title IX. In less formal communications, they have sometimes appeared 
more in sync with those who aspire toward cultural change. See Sam Dillon, Biden to Discuss New 
Guidelines About Campus Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A13 (noting that in discussing 
the 2011 DCL, Russlyn Ali emphasized the “terrible and alarming trend in the country of sexual 
violence”); Stephanie Haven, Campus Sexual Assault: ‘Shouldn’t Have Waited This Long’ 
to Address, Official Says, MCCLATCHYDC (July 31, 2014, 4:41 PM), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article24771280.html [https://perma.cc/CMH4-4R
MV] (recording Catherine Lhamon’s disappointment in the “general cultural expectation that a 
[rite] of passage for students into adulthood will include sexual assault and sexual violence” and 
her aspiration for “a sea change for us as a country”); Robin Wilson, 2014 Influence List: Enforcer, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Enforcer-Catherine-
E-Lhamon/150837 [https://perma.cc/5TS9-9QVY] (noting that in Lhamon’s words, she aspired 
for a future in which young women’s experiences were “not marked by sexual violence”). 
 152. Kingkade, supra note 140. 
 153. Annie E. Clark, ‘The Hunting Ground’: Tackling Campus Sexual Assaults, CNN (Nov. 
22, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/22/opinions/clark-the-hunting-ground [https://
perma.cc/M55P-QRRX]. 
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similar terms, using language that directly invokes the spirit of VAWA 
and the thinking of Catherine MacKinnon. The goal, Brodsky 
explained in a major news outlet in 2014, was a “national civil right to 
freedom from sexual violence” and an alternative to a “broken” 
criminal law system.154 Post-Morrison, she continued, Title IX was “our 
only national model.”155 
II.  THE RIGHTS-GENERATING HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
That activists and advocates have looked to an administrative 
agency to articulate and enforce a “national civil right to be free from 
sexual violence” may strike some readers as unusual. When it comes to 
the creation and recognition of new, national rights, we often associate 
that process with the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Congress. In 
popular narratives, it is the Supreme Court that gave Americans the 
right to nonsegregated public spaces and schools, the right to an 
abortion, and the right to marry a partner of a different race or the 
same sex.156 Likewise, Congress appears to have awarded Americans 
such novel guarantees as the right to the public disclosure of 
government information, the right to a modicum of security in old age, 
and the right to a safe and non-discriminatory workplace.157 
This Part reminds readers that modern American history is rife 
with examples of administrative agencies creating new rights, or at least 
 
 154. Alexandra Brodsky, Don’t Criminalize College Responses to Sexual Violence, AL 
JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/title-ix-
sexual-assaultrapecollegecampuscriminaljusticegatto.html [https://perma.cc/K39K-UQAZ]. 
 155. Id. On MacKinnon’s influence, see Emily Bazelon, The Return of the Sex Wars, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/magazine/the-return-of-the-
sex-wars.html [https://perma.cc/XR95-4B6G] (“‘[MacKinnon] resonates with us for recognizing 
the way sexual violence holds back individuals and classes of marginalized people from 
flourishing,’ said Alexandra Brodsky . . . .”); Alexandra Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, The 
Promise of Title IX: Sexual Violence and the Law, DISSENT (Fall 2015), https://www.
dissentmagazine.org/article/title-ix-activism-sexual-violence-law [https://perma.cc/9PBH-85PA] 
(invoking MacKinnon’s work in explaining the genesis of today’s student movement against 
sexual assault).  
 156. These rights are generally associated with the following canonical and well-known 
Supreme Court cases: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 157. These rights appear to owe their existence to the following statutes: the Freedom of 
Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)), the 
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. ch. 7), the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 255–266 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012)).  
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playing significant roles in their generation, elaboration, and 
legitimization.158 This appears to be especially so in the realm of 
equality rights, as Professor Olatunde Johnson has argued, where 
major statutes have laid the groundwork for a “proactive, affirmative,” 
“bureaucratic form of enforcement.”159 The existing civil rights 
literature pays relatively little attention to this bureaucratic realm, 
Johnson notes.160 But a growing body of historically informed 
administrative law scholarship has begun to fill the void. 
Professor Sophia Lee, for example, has documented the role of 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in advancing the idea of a right 
to a workplace free of discrimination—years before the enactment of 
Title VII and at a time when the Supreme Court had never suggested 
such a right.161 Professor Ming Hsu Chen has made similar findings with 
 
 158. In addition to the examples cited below, see Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: 
The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557 (2007) (“[I]t 
was the post office—not the Fourth Amendment of its own independent force—that originally 
gave us the notion of communications privacy that we now view as an abstract constitutional 
principle applicable to telephone conversations, e-mails, and the like.”); Jeremy K. Kessler, The 
Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1164 (2014) 
(“[M]odern First Amendment doctrine emerged from a contest between administrative and 
judicial authority over civil-libertarian rights enforcement.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative 
Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (2013) (documenting “actions by federal 
administrative agencies to interpret and implement the U.S. Constitution”). For further 
discussion, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). Note, however, that agencies have at 
times also rejected novel rights claims and have narrowed the reach of established guarantees. 
See, e.g., Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of 
Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 65 (describing national security agencies’ 
historical “instinct toward aggressive national security norms,” with a corresponding cost to 
individual constitutional rights); Joy Milligan, The Reluctant State: Civil Rights, Administrative 
Constitutionalism, and Institutional Design (Dec. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (documenting the DOE’s resistance to expansive understandings of equal 
protection in the 1950s and 1960s); Karen M. Tani, Administrative Constitutionalism at the 
“Borders of Belonging”: Drawing on History to Expand the Archive and Change the Lens (Sept. 
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (documenting the narrow 
constitutional interpretations of the Freedmen’s Bureau agents and federal immigration 
inspectors in the late nineteenth century). 
 159. Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in 
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1343–44 (2012). 
 160. Id. at 1344; see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering That Has No Name: Title VI and 
the Meaning of Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1330 (2014) (noting that scholars 
have written extensively about private court enforcement of Title VI and very little about the way 
in which agencies have elaborated the meaning of that provision). 
 161. See, e.g., SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO 
THE NEW RIGHT 42 (2015). Starting in the 1940s, the NLRB gave credence to the idea that racially 
segregated unions might run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, at least if 
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regard to language rights. According to Chen, it was the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the 
EEOC—more so than Congress or the courts—that established “a 
right to access government programs without regard to language 
ability.”162 Administrators located this right in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of “national origin” 
but made no reference to language ability.163 Through the issuance of 
guidance documents and the undertaking of discrete enforcement 
actions, administrators “transformed language barriers into a legally 
redressable problem” and “concretized” a right that had been nebulous 
at best.164 
 
those unions held a “closed-shop” agreement with an employer (that is, one in which the employer 
agreed to hire only union members). See id. Lee shows how this idea cropped up in a 1945 decision 
by the NLRB’s chief trial examiner, as well as in the agency’s 1946 annual report. Id. The idea 
that racially segregated unions could violate the Equal Protection Clause survived inside the 
NLRB throughout the 1950s, even as dozens of fair employment laws died in Congress and as the 
Supreme Court carefully avoided deciding the issue. Id. at 102–05. Later, in 1964, the NLRB 
issued Independent Metal Workers, Locals 1 & 2 (Hughes Tool Co.), which formally announced a 
right to antidiscrimination in collective bargaining. Indep. Metal Workers, Locals 1 & 2 (Hughes 
Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1576–77 (1964). Significantly, the decision took effect a full year 
before Title VII, which was enacted on the same day that Hughes Tool Co. came down, but gave 
employers a year-long grace period. Id. at 1578. 
 The FCC story is similar, but went beyond racial discrimination to implicate 
discrimination on the basis of sex. A year before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Lee notes, FCC attorneys recognized a right to nondiscrimination in employment and attempted 
to enforce that right through the FCC’s authority to grant or deny licenses to broadcasting 
companies. See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and 
the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 813–16 (2010). They maintained that 
stance even as the Attorney General rejected the constitutional underpinnings of their argument, 
and as Congress and the Supreme Court avoided clarifying the issue. See id. at 818–20. Lee also 
documents how, in the wake of the enactment of Title VII, the FCC went well beyond what the 
text of that statute required, adopting a rule that affirmatively required all broadcasters to 
“establish, maintain, and carry out, a positive continuing program of specific practices designed 
to assure equal opportunity in every aspect of station employment and practice.” Id. at 834. A 
year later, the FCC adopted the same rule for the telegraph and telephone companies it regulated. 
Id. at 834–36. By January of 1973, with the help of allies in the EEOC, the FCC had reshaped the 
employment practices of an entire industry, through a landmark settlement with AT&T. Id. at 
842–43.  
 162. Ming Hsu Chen, Governing by Guidance: Civil Rights Agencies and the Emergence of 
Language Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 294 (2014).  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 311, 340. In the case of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW), administrators embedded this right in a key 1970 guidance document, issued pursuant to 
HEW’s authority under Title VI. Id. at 313. In Chen’s words, the document “required schools to 
take ‘affirmative steps’ to open up their instructional programs to language minority students 
wherever the ‘inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national-origin 
minority group children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a 
school district.’” Id. at 314. Within just four years, the Supreme Court had upheld the agency’s 
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My own research on federal–state public assistance programs 
(authorized by the Social Security Act of 1935) offers yet another 
example. Starting in the late 1930s and continuing into the 1960s, 
federal administrators sought to embed a more robust idea of 
constitutional equal protection into the realm of social welfare, relying 
on a statute that said nothing about equality or rights. Indeed, many 
Americans at that time understood government welfare as little 
different from a charitable handout—something to be given on a 
discretionary basis, and only to the most deserving.165 Federal welfare 
administrators nonetheless insisted that, when it came to behavior and 
morality, poor people be scrutinized only to the extent that the 
nonpoor were scrutinized.166 These same administrators also insisted 
on equality across program beneficiaries: people who were equally 
needy should receive the same treatment.167 Phrased differently, 
administrators advanced the view—controversial for the time—that all 
Americans, even ones who were not economically self-sufficient, had a 
right to equal protection of the laws.168 
The point of these diverse examples is this: in various policy areas, 
agencies have played an important role in articulating and legitimizing 
new rights—rights that could be described narrowly, but that also 
 
understanding of national origin discrimination, and shortly thereafter, Congress enacted 
legislation codifying the agency’s informal directive. Id. at 317. 
 The EEOC narrative is more complicated, but cuts in the same direction. Through a 
general guidance document released in 1970 and a more specific guidance document issued ten 
years later, the EEOC declared that to deny an employment opportunity on the basis of “linguistic 
characteristics” was to violate the affected individual’s civil rights under Title VII. Id. at 323–26 
(emphasis omitted). Judicial responses to the EEOC’s interpretation were mixed, but 
administrative enforcement actions ensured that the EEOC’s interpretation nonetheless “shaped 
the policies and practices of a variety of employers,” ranging from manufacturers to hair salons. 
Id. at 328–30. 
 165. See generally Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (2015) (drawing on internal 
communications from the Social Security Board and its successor agencies to document federal 
administrators’ unconventional approach to the equal protection rights of the poor). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 849–50. This proposition may sound uncontroversial today. Historically, however, 
an individual’s access to income support depended on such factors as the individual’s race, 
perceived morality, and compliance with community norms. See, e.g., id. at 886–87. As late as the 
1930s, it was not uncommon to refer to poor individuals as “paupers,” people who by definition 
had abandoned their civil and political rights in exchange for public support. See generally KAREN 
M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–
1972, at 27–43 (2016) (describing the system of poor relief that reformers had attempted to 
displace in the mid-1930s).  
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seemed to harbor expansive potential.169 It should not surprise us, then, 
to see twenty-first-century citizens attempting to harness OCR’s power 
for such an end. To date, however, scholars have not thought about 
OCR’s enforcement efforts in these terms. 
These historical examples also inform this Article in a second 
regard—by suggesting new and important lines of research for those 
who are interested in OCR’s campaign against campus sexual assault. 
In general, each of these examples suggests how agencies can help 
new rights gain traction in political and institutional contexts where 
other authoritative lawmaking bodies are unwilling or unavailable to 
do this work. But these examples also showcase agencies’ limits and 
vulnerabilities. For example, in Lee’s account of antidiscrimination 
rights in workplace bargaining, a prominent theme is the NLRB’s 
incomplete power to implement those rights. What the NLRB could 
do depended on the complaints that private parties brought to it for 
resolution and how the parties chose to frame those complaints.170 Lee 
notes that during a period in which the NLRB took a more expansive 
view of workplace rights, the agency received only “a trickle of 
discrimination charges.”171 Chen’s work on language rights suggests 
that administratively generated rights may wax and wane over time, 
perhaps more so than rights generated in other ways. Tracing these 
rights forward in time, into the 1990s and 2000s, Chen finds that 
language rights became less robust in the public education context, 
where they first developed, even as they spread to other important 
policy areas, such as election law.172 
My work on “administrative equal protection” in federal–state 
welfare programs calls into question whether the ostensible holders of 
administratively created rights are even aware of those rights and, if so, 
whether they are able to exercise them. Welfare recipients did 
occasionally advance equal protection-type claims in the 1940s and 
 
 169. Others have documented this phenomenon more fully (and have taken a much stronger 
normative stance). See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 158, at 33 (identifying executive 
officials as among “America’s primary governmental norm entrepreneurs” and setting the stage 
for a detailed analysis of the ways in which they “advance[d] new fundamental principles”).  
 170. LEE, supra note 161, at 105–06, 163 (discussing the significance of a complainant’s 
decision to file unfair labor practice charges against a racially segregated union while declining to 
seek decertification, and noting that “NLRB and court actions relied on a complainant’s stepping 
forward”).  
 171. Id. at 189. 
 172. Ming Hsu Chen, Language Rights as a Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 67 SMU L. 
REV. 247, 253–55 (2014).  
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1950s, when federal administrators were most interested in this issue,173 
but there seems to have been a wide gap between the confident 
assertions of federal welfare administrators and the actual experiences 
and perceptions of poor Americans.174 Not until the mid-1960s did a 
national welfare rights movement emerge, and although federal 
administrators seem to have influenced that movement, it was not 
through direct legitimations of individual rights claims.175 
The same research also highlights the inevitable spottiness of 
administratively generated rights. The statute that federal welfare 
administrators were working with—the Social Security Act—
authorized grants for only certain types of income support: Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children (in other 
words, the statute was not in the nature of “general relief”).176 These 
aid programs encompassed millions of people but excluded many 
others, most notably able-bodied, nonelderly adults. The result was 
that federal administrators could exert unprecedented influence on 
how state and local governments treated some needy citizens, but had 
no control over how these same actors treated others. In addition, 
federal administrators’ jurisdiction was limited to public assistance. 
They had no say over the many other areas of state law (for example, 
family law and criminal law) that, in practice, continued to set poor 
people apart from their wealthier peers. 
In summary, administrative articulations of rights appear to be a 
feature of modern American governance. But historically, these rights 
have had limitations, attributable at least in part to the institutional 
limitations of agencies themselves. This broad observation sets the 
stage for new lines of inquiry regarding OCR and its embrace by those 
who aspire toward a national right to be free from sexual violence. The 
following Part explains. 
 
 173. TANI, supra note 168, at 141–49, 200–01.  
 174. Id. at 113–49, (noting that although welfare recipients in the 1940s and 1950s claimed 
their legal rights more frequently than scholars have assumed, equal protection arguments 
remained rare; id. at 205–11 (documenting an onslaught of state-level policies in the 1950s that 
attempted to hold welfare recipients to higher standards of conduct than other members of the 
population).  
 175. On the complex relationship between the rights articulations of federal administrators 
and the modern welfare rights movement, see id. at 212–69. 
 176. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. ch. 7). 
As amended in 1950, the Act also authorized grants for state-run programs of aid to the 
permanently and totally disabled. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-734, 
§ 1401, 64 Stat. 477, 555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1351 (2012)).  
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III.  INTERROGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
To date, much of the research on OCR’s campaign against sexual 
assault has focused on conventional administrative law concerns, such 
as the legal process afforded to those affected by the agency’s actions177 
and the agency’s compliance with the letter and spirit of existing legal 
constraints.178 This Part flags a different set of questions, informed by 
 
 177. Numerous articles explore OCR’s influence on the procedural protections available to 
those accused of campus sexual assault, a context in which the stakes are high and the potential 
for racial and gender bias is real. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 19, at 915–17. See generally AM. 
ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, THE HISTORY, USES, AND ABUSES OF TITLE IX 78–80 (2016), 
https://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIXreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ75-PXPF] (criticizing OCR for 
its inadequate protection of the due process rights of the accused and raising concerns about the 
potential for biased enforcement of campus sexual misconduct policies); Janet Halley, Trading 
the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015) 
(suggesting the ways in which racial and cultural biases may creep into the complaint-handling 
processes that OCR has required); Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student 
Defendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 54 (2013) 
(arguing that the OCR-mandated process for adjudicating allegations of sexual assault on campus 
“is fundamentally unfair to the accused” and tends to result in inaccurate findings of 
responsibility); Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, A Brick on the Other: 
Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 
GA. L. REV. 591 (2013) (discussing the procedural requirements that OCR has imposed on 
colleges and universities and arguing that these requirements unfairly disadvantage the accused—
who, most often, are men); Elizabeth Bartholet, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-
sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html [https:perma.cc/62MG-
V29T] (documenting twenty-eight Harvard Law School professors’ opposition to the university’s 
revised sexual harassment policy, which was an effort to comply with OCR’s guidance); Law 
Professors’ Open Letter Regarding Campus Free Speech and Sexual Assault (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Law-Professor-Open-Letter-May-16-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YWL3-GLUM] (registering twenty-one law professors’ concerns about the 
imperilment of due process on campus). The critiques are not limited to academics. See Peter 
Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, WALL STREET J., Aug. 
20, 2011, at A13 (arguing that OCR’s directives have undermined the due process rights of men 
accused of sexual assault); Dorment, supra note 116, at 97–98, 124 (describing an incident where 
a school adjudicator treated an accused student unfairly, and suggesting the inappropriateness of 
a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof); Charles M. Sevilla, Campus Sexual Assault 
Allegations, Adjudications, and Title IX, CHAMPION, Nov. 2015, at 16, 17–18 (arguing that colleges 
trying to comply with OCR’s Title IX guidance have effectively eliminated due process 
guarantees); James Taranto, An Education in College Justice, WALL STREET J., Dec. 7, 2013, at 
A13 (arguing that OCR’s actions left accused students vulnerable to false accusations and 
unfair procedures, with the effects being felt mostly by men); Emily Yoffe, The College Rape 
Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/
doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/GH63-HL4N] (arguing that many accused of sexual violence at schools are 
being treated unfairly).  
 178. Many scholars have raised the possibility of administrative overreach—that is, of OCR 
administrators going beyond their charge and circumventing the processes designed to hold them 
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the historical interpretation advanced in Part I (where the Article 
connects OCR’s recent campaign to a longer battle for a right to 
freedom from sexual violence) and the historical parallels discussed in 
Part II: First, what happens when agencies articulate or otherwise 
advance novel rights, but when actual rights claims must proceed 
through regulated entities rather than through the regulator (or a 
court)? Second, how should we think about administratively created 
rights in a world of mutable administrative interpretations and 
enforcement schemes? And third, what happens to rights when they 
are pegged to an agency’s incomplete jurisdiction? 
 
accountable to Congress and the public. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 19, at 909 (explaining how 
OCR “achieved complete compliance with its nonbinding guidance document without ever 
having to defend its reasoning through public comments or judicial review”); Katie Jo 
Baumgardner, Note, Resisting Rulemaking: Challenging the Montana Settlement’s Title IX Sexual 
Harassment Blueprint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2014) (arguing that OCR has used 
compliance investigations to give informal guidance documents the same legal force as rules 
promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act); Law Professors’ Open Letter, supra 
note 177, at 2–3, 4 (same). See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Guidances in Modern 
Administrative Procedure: The Case for De Novo Review, 8 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 47, 80 (2015) 
(criticizing OCR’s use of guidance documents in the Title IX-sexual assault context and detailing 
what the author sees as OCR’s more general “pattern of abusive guidance behavior”). Arguments 
about administrative overreach have also appeared in Congress and the courts. See Examining 
the Use of Agency Regulatory Guidance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs and 
Fed. Mgmt. of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 18–19, 31–
33 (2015); Complaint at 3, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 1:16-cv-01158 (D.D.C. June 16. 2016). 
 A particularly egregious overreach, according to some commentators, is OCR’s attempt 
to change campus climates in ways that override academic freedom and foster a toxic environment 
of identity politics. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 177, at 14–21 (documenting 
cases in which the administration of Title IX on college campuses has arguably intruded on 
academic freedom and free speech); Wendy Kaminer, The SaVE Act: Trading Liberty for  
Security on Campus, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/
2011/04/the-save-act-trading-liberty-for-security-on-campus/237833n[https://perma.cc/N7UY-44
6B] (associating OCR’s efforts to enforce Title IX with the decline of civil liberties on college 
campuses); Laura Kipnis, My Title IX Inquisition, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29, 2015), 
http://laurakipnis.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/My-Title-IX-Inquisition-The-Chronicle-
Review-.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QY6-ZEP8] (detailing the Title IX complaint leveled against her 
after she published the previously cited essay and noting the chilling effect that the current climate 
has on professors); Kipnis, supra note 20 (arguing that OCR’s efforts to combat sexual misconduct 
on college campuses have contributed to a climate in which speech is silenced); Law Professors’ 
Open Letter, supra note 177, at 3 (registering concerns about free speech). Some critics argue that 
OCR is encouraging students to assume the posture of children and victims rather than of capable, 
tolerant adults. Gersen & Suk, supra note 19, at 918–23 (noting that recent campus climate 
surveys—encouraged by OCR—have adopted expansive definitions of sexual violence and 
suggesting that such measurement devices shape the meaning that students give to their sexual 
experiences); Kipnis, supra note 20 (associating the administration of Title IX on campus with an 
unhealthy and unhelpful infantilization of adult students).  
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In a country in which rights remain “the coin of th[e] realm,”179 
these are the kinds of questions that demand consideration. Such 
consideration appears particularly urgent with regard to sexual 
violence—a topic that many women and their allies have forced into 
the news in recent months, following the election of a president 
accused of multiple incidents of sexual misconduct. This Part begins 
that exploratory work and sketches out paths for others to follow. 
A. Mediated Rights  
If OCR’s recent enforcement work is indeed bound up with the 
aspirations of generations of would-be rights claimers—people who 
believe in a national right to be free from sexual violence and have 
turned to OCR to advance it—an important question is what happens 
to actual rights claims when channeled through administrative 
machinery. Answering that question requires consideration of a more 
general trend in administrative law and practice: as Professor Kenneth 
Bamberger has observed, today’s administrative agencies have moved 
away from a top-down “command-and-control” model of enforcement 
and instead commonly rely on the expertise and judgment of the 
private entities that they regulate.180 What that means for agency-
articulated rights may be that rights claims proceed first, and perhaps 
only, through a regulated institution rather than through the agency 
itself. 
To the extent that individuals are using administrative Title IX 
complaints to assert a right to be free from sexual violence, that right 
is filtered, or mediated, in precisely this way. When an individual 
student claims sexual violation, the key decisionmaker is the student’s 
college or university, not the federal agency.181 Once made aware of a 
 
 179. JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF 
BIG GOVERNMENT 260 (2011). 
 180. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, 
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L J. 377, 386–99 (2006). 
 181. State courts are also a potential avenue for legal redress, but not one that victims have 
been able to rely upon. Only about 12 percent of reported sexual assaults result in arrests. WHITE 
HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN AND GIRLS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RENEWED CALL TO 
ACTION 16–17 (2014). And even with a suspect in hand, prosecutors are notoriously reluctant to 
file charges. Megan A. Alderden & Sarah E. Ullman, Creating a More Complete and Current 
Picture: Examining Police and Prosecutor Decision-Making When Processing Sexual Assault 
Cases, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 525, 528 (2012). Private civil suits are another option, and, 
notably, a handful of states have VAWA-like civil rights remedies on the books. Julie Goldscheid, 
The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down But Not Ruled 
Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165–71 (2005). But all civil suits require time, money, and a willing 
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flawed institutional response to such a claim, OCR could, of course, 
find a violation of the student’s right to equal educational opportunity, 
and as part of a subsequent resolution agreement with the institution, 
OCR could help secure such individual remedies as a new housing 
assignment, a modified class schedule, and reimbursement for the costs 
of counseling, tuition, and so on.182 But in terms of adjudicating the 
wrongfulness of the alleged sexual violation—of saying, “the actions 
that occurred here violated your bodily integrity and ought to trigger 
authoritative sanctions”—the formal power rests with the institution. 
As for the actual outcomes of campus-level adjudications, 
research is sparse. Given the rise of the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard in campus disciplinary bodies and OCR’s more 
visible presence on campus,183 some commentators assume that rights 
claimers now fare well.184 Beyond scattered anecdotes, however, it is 
unclear whether institutions now vindicate such claims more frequently 
than before.185 Meanwhile, other anecdotes suggest a rights-claiming 
 
lawyer—resources that many victims do not have. Existing doctrine also continues to pose 
obstacles for plaintiffs. See generally Julie Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual 
Violence Law Reform, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 732, 768–70 (2007) (explaining the challenges that 
civil claims pose to plaintiffs seeking redress for sexual violence).  
 182. Dana Bolger, Gender Violence Costs: Schools’ Financial Obligations Under Title IX, 125 
YALE L.J. 2106, 2112 (2016). Bolger is a cofounder of the sexual assault survivor advocacy 
organization KYIX, discussed in the text accompanying note 143. 
 183. See Samantha Harris, Campus Judiciaries on Trial: An Update from the Courts, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/10/campus-
judiciaries-on-trial-an-update-from-the-courts [https://perma.cc/4W4X-AT64]. The word “rise” is 
used with caution. Research shows that in 2002—that is, before OCR’s current enforcement 
campaign—“only one in five colleges and universities identified any standard of proof in their 
codes [of campus conduct], and [of] those that did, eighty percent used a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.” Anderson, supra note 100, at 46–47.  
 184. See, e.g., JOHNSON & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 38 (“Obviously, lowering the standard 
of proof . . . will in and of itself increase the number of accused students found guilty.”); Epstein, 
supra note 178, at 78 (suggesting that “colleges, acting under pressure from the OCR, now 
commonly expel students accused of sexual harassment or assault,” including students “who are 
very likely innocent”). Other commentators have suggested that even with the change in the 
standard of proof, the problem is more likely leniency than over-punishment. See, e.g., Deborah 
L. Rhode, Rape on Campus and in the Military: An Agenda for Reform, 23 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 
1, 11 (2016).  
 185. Epstein bases his conclusion on an article from the conservative website Liberty 
Unyielding, which in turn bases its claim on a small sample of anecdotal evidence. Epstein, supra 
note 178, at 91. The Huffington Post has gathered data about the rate and severity of discipline, 
but only since 2011. Tyler Kingkade, Fewer than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases 
Result in Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/09/29/campus-sexual-assault_n_5888742.html [https://perma.cc/JH3M-Z3XA] (drawing on 
an original data set—records compiled from about three dozen universities—to document a 30 
percent expulsion rate among students found responsible for sexual assault). 
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process that is hardly straightforward. Campus investigations and 
adjudications continue to take many months, sometimes extending 
beyond the graduation dates of one or more of the parties.186 Individual 
complaints filed directly with OCR may take even longer to resolve,187 
and at least one prominent institution has reportedly offered financial 
settlements to students in exchange for dropping such complaints.188 
Some complainants describe feeling revictimized by the very process 
of asserting their rights.189  
These anecdotal findings call to mind research from a closely 
related field: workplace discrimination—which, recall, has been 
interpreted to include sexual harassment. Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,190 an individual claims the right to 
nondiscrimination by filing a complaint against his or her employer 
with the EEOC or state-level equivalent; if the agency does not resolve 
the complaint (in most instances, it does not), the individual files a 
lawsuit in federal court.191 In practice, however, many more claims are 
 
 186. See, e.g., Alex Stuckey & Annie Knox, Students Who Report Sexual Assaults to Utah 
Colleges Endure a Traumatic Process, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 27, 2016, 11:21 AM), http://
www.sltrib.com/home/3914771-155/not-just-byu-students-at-other [https://perma.cc/H5DP-YW
7P] (describing a case in which a university convened a panel nine months after the accusation, 
after the victim had graduated). 
 187. See Alyssa Peterson & Olivia Ortiz, A Better Balance: Providing Survivors of Sexual 
Violence with “Effective Protection” Against Sex Discrimination Through Title IX Complaints, 125 
YALE L.J. 2132, 2137 (2016); Jake New, Justice Delayed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May  
6, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/06/ocr-letter-says-completed-title-ix-
investigations-2014-lasted-more-4-years [https://perma.cc/PQA8-B2WP] (“It took the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, on average, 1,469 days to complete campus 
sexual assault investigations in 2014 . . . .”). 
 188. See Elena Kadvany, Student: Stanford Offered Settlement for Sexual-Assault Case, PALO 
ALTO ONLINE (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/12/08/student-
stanford-offered-settlement-for-sexual-assault-case [https://perma.cc/9VKH-88AW]. 
 189. Chris Caesar, Emmanuel College Freshman Says She Won’t Return After School’s 
Handling of Sex Assault Case, METRO (Boston, Mass.) (July 26, 2016), http://www.
metro.us/boston/emmanuel-college-freshman-says-she-won-t-return-after-school-s-handling-of-
sex-assault-case/zsJpgz---uQHxeJDNMXDU [https://perma.cc/2CLE-TAZR]; David Koon, 
How Title IX Hurts the Sexual Assault Victims It’s Supposed to Protect at the University of 
Arkansas, ARK. TIMES (July 14, 2016), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/how-title-ix-hurts-the-
sexual-assault-victims-its-supposed-to-protect-at-the-university-of-arkansas/Content?oid=44899
32 [https://perma.cc/8UBK-KP95]; Stuckey & Knox, supra note 186; Sarah Schuch, Lengthy UM-
Flint Sex Assault Investigations Frustrate Students, MLIVE (Aug. 14, 2015 5:00 AM), http://
www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/08/um-flint_students_frustrated_o.html [https://perma.
cc/A53T-FD63]. 
 190. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting employers 
from discriminating against any individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”). 
 191. EDELMAN, supra note 105, at 158.  
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resolved through employers’ internal dispute resolution processes than 
through formal legal channels.192 In other words, claims of sexual 
harassment in the workplace are filtered through the institutions that 
the EEOC regulates, just as claims of sexual assault on campus are 
filtered through the colleges and universities regulated by OCR. 
Research into the former suggests that rights claims do not fare well in 
such settings.193 
The adjudication of individual rights violations is not the only way 
that a regulated entity might vindicate a right, however. The regulated 
entity could also support rights at the “front end” by fostering 
conditions under which violations are less likely to occur. Here again, 
research from the field of employment discrimination appears 
relevant. This research suggests that regulated entities will change their 
practices in order to conform to legal norms, but not necessarily 
because of any inherent commitment to those norms. Employers, at 
least, are motivated by the desire to appear legitimate and to minimize 
the law’s encroachment on their power over employees.194 The result is 
a heavy reliance on “symbolic structures,” policies and procedures that 
“connote attention to law or legal principles, whether or not they 
contribute to the substantive achievement of legal ideals.”195 What this 
has meant in the context of workplace discrimination is a robust 
commitment to grievance procedures, formal antidiscrimination 
policies, and other institutionalized signals of good faith, but a thin 
commitment to establishing diverse and inclusive workplace 
environments.196 
The analogy to Title IX is imperfect—Title IX does not regulate 
employers but education providers, and the relationship between these 
 
 192. According to Professor Lauren Edelman, “less than 1 percent of perceived instances of 
employment discrimination proceed[] to trial.” Id. at 158–59.  
 193. Id. at 128–33; see also Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights 
Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC. REV. 83, 99, 
105 (2005) (finding that when women employees utilized internal grievance procedures to 
complain about sexual harassment, managers wielded their discretion in ways that discouraged 
complaints and adopted narrow readings of employees’ rights). “[T]o the extent that rights are 
mentioned,” Edelman adds, “it is usually the privacy rights of the perpetrator.” EDELMAN, supra 
note 105, at 131.  
 194. See generally Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute 
Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC. REV. 497, 515, 
530 (1993) (arguing that employers understand compliance with civil rights regulations as good 
management, and finding that internal complaint procedures strengthen employers’ legitimacy 
and authority).  
 195. EDELMAN, supra note 105, at 5.  
 196. Id. at 100–23. 
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providers and their students is not (exclusively) “managerial,” even in 
this era of the corporatized university.197 And yet the symbolic 
compliance frame may fit. Consider sociologist Chrysanthi Leon’s 
observations of her home institution, the University of Delaware, when 
it was the subject of an OCR investigation in 2014.198 Leon notes that 
the university quickly adopted and implemented the kinds of symbolic 
structures that its lawyers believed OCR wanted to see, including 
improved procedures for collecting data and policies that adjusted the 
standard of proof in campus disciplinary proceedings.199 Leon found 
little evidence, however, of an institutional commitment to “ending 
sexual violence.”200 
All this is to say: there is a need for rigorous study of what 
institutions are and are not doing to make freedom from sexual 
violence a meaningful right on campus, and there are models for doing 
it. Such research matters because of the light it will shed on the efficacy 
of administratively created rights—a feature, as I have argued, of 
modern American governance. It matters, as well, because of what it 
could suggest about students’ understandings of their rights and what 
 
 197. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 177, at 89–90 (noting the 
“corporatization of the university” in recent decades).  
 198. Chrysanthi S. Leon, Law, Mansplainin’, and Myth Accommodation in Campus Sexual 
Assault Reform, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 987, 988–989 (2016). 
 199. Id. at 1004–16; see also Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 
MD. L. REV. 590, 612– 13 (2016) (stating that administrators, even while “genuinely embrac[ing] 
the ideological goals” of Title VII, devise policies more focused on “shield[ing] the university” 
from liability than “resolv[ing] underlying cultural issues and practices that contribute to sexual 
assault”).  
 200. Leon, supra note 198, at 1016; see also AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 177, 
at 90 (“[C]ollege and university efforts to comply with Title IX have followed the trail blazed by 
departments of human resources, where the establishment of reporting protocols and internal 
processes can take precedence over holistic challenges to prevailing gender and sexual norms.”). 
This critique loses force if we cannot imagine institutional responses that would make rights 
violations less likely to occur, but that exercise is not difficult in this context. According to 
multiple recent studies, men belonging to fraternities were three times more likely to commit rape 
than other men on college campuses. See Elizabeth A. Armstrong, Laura Hamilton & Brian 
Sweeney, Sexual Assault on Campus: A Multilevel, Integrative Approach to Party Rape, 53 SOC. 
PROBLEMS 483, 489–92 (2006) (linking campus sexual assault to the cultures that fraternities 
foster and the coercive practices they enable); Catherine Loh, Christine A. Gidycz, Tracy R. Lobo 
& Rohini Luthra, A Prospective Analysis of Sexual Assault Perpetration: Risk Factors Related to 
Perpetrator Characteristics, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1325, 1339–40 (2005); see also John 
D. Foubert, Johnathan T. Newberry & Jerry L. Tatum, Behavior Differences Seven Months Later: 
Effects of a Rape Prevention Program, 44 J. STUDENT AFF. RES. & PRAC. 728, 730 (2007) 
(“Among men on college campuses, fraternity men are more likely to commit rape than other 
college men.”). To date, however, many institutions have done little to diminish fraternities’ 
power. 
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they will (or will not) demand of government institutions going 
forward.201 
B. Mutable Rights 
We tend to see durability as a defining feature of rights, perhaps 
because we associate rights with the Constitution (difficult to change) 
and with the courts (bound by precedent). How should we think about 
rights that emerge from the modern administrative state, in which 
flexibility and mutability are—at least for now—a defining feature?202 
How should we think about the right to freedom from sexual violence, 
in particular? 
To be sure, there are some aspects of OCR’s efforts that seem 
likely to endure. One is the massive rise in Title IX coordinators, 
institutional employees whose job includes processing complaints of 
sexual violence and otherwise monitoring compliance with OCR’s 
mandates.203 Four years after signing its resolution agreement with 
OCR, Yale University boasts not only a Lead Title IX Coordinator but 
also two Senior Deputy Title IX Coordinators and eighteen Deputy 
Title IX Coordinators.204 Three separate Title IX committees, 
comprised of faculty and staff, provide additional support.205 At smaller 
 
 201. For example, research from the domain of employment discrimination suggests that, 
over time, employees have tended to incorporate their employers’ “understandings of law and 
rights into their own assessments,” which in turn has encouraged them “to see rights mobilization 
as inappropriate.” EDELMAN, supra note 105, at 160; see also Marshall, supra note 193, at 111 
(describing how some female employees in her study anticipated their supervisors’ likely 
responses to their complaints of sexual harassment and “incorporat[ed] the adversarial response 
into their own evaluation of the situation”).  
 202. With the Republican Party in control of both Congress and the White House, lawmakers 
seem likely to attempt to rein in administrative agencies. One way of doing so would be to make 
it more difficult for agencies to do anything, including change direction. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 
114-427 (2015) (requiring that any “major rule” (as defined by the statute) be approved by a joint 
resolution of Congress prior to taking effect); H.R. REP. NO. 114-185 (2015) (adding substantial 
procedural and documentation requirements to the informal rulemaking process). I thank Reuel 
Schiller for these citations and insights.  
 203. Anemona Hartocollis, In Battling Sexual Misconduct, Colleges Build a Bureaucracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016, at A1; Audrey Williams June, Overseeing Sex-Assault Cases Is Now a Full-
Time Job, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Overseeing-
Sex-Assault-Cases/149739 [https://perma.cc/4WJG-KJCF].  
 204. Office of the Provost: Title IX Coordinators, YALE UNIV., http://provost.yale.edu/title-
ix/coordinators [https://perma.cc/L4G8-C92Y]. 
 205. Title IX Committees, YALE UNIV., http://provost.yale.edu/title-ix/committees [https://
perma.cc/GP6T-DLG8]; see also Hartocollis, supra note 203, at A1 (“At Yale, nearly 30 faculty 
and staff members work part time or full time in support of Title IX efforts, and twice as many 
faculty and staff members and students volunteer as advisers and committee members.”).  
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institutions, the picture is not so different. For example, at Wheaton 
College in Massachusetts, a Lead Title IX Coordinator, four Deputy 
Coordinators, and a Sexual Misconduct and Assault Resource Team 
serve a student body of around 1600.206 There is now even a national 
organization of Title IX administrators, some 7000 members strong 
and with every reason to emphasize the value of those members’ 
expertise.207 Extrapolating from the history of compliance officers in 
academia more generally, we should not expect these trends to reverse, 
even if signals from OCR change.208 
But other aspects of OCR’s handiwork seem more vulnerable to 
change. At the institutional level, much of what OCR has achieved has 
occurred through a robust use of its enforcement power, culminating 
in a bevy of resolution agreements. A resolution agreement is no 
guarantee, however, that a university will remain committed to its 
promises. Note, for example, OCR’s multiple investigations of the 
University of Notre Dame, notwithstanding a 2011 resolution 
agreement.209 Note, too, the weakness of such resolution agreements if 
OCR signals that it will monitor them less rigorously or deploy its 
enforcement authority more modestly going forward.210 Such a path 
seems likely under the Trump administration, whether because of 
budget cuts, leadership decisions, or both.211 
 
 206. See Sexual Assault Information and Resources: Title IX Information, WHEATON COLL., 
https://wheatoncollege.edu/sexual-assault/titleix-information [https://perma.cc/K3DH-4CNM]. 
 207. ASS’N OF TITLE IX ADM’RS, http://atixa.org [https://perma.cc/4DD4-J9GC]. 
 208. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, What Went Wrong With Title IX?, WASH. MONTHLY 
(Sept./Oct. 2015), http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septoct-2015/what-went-wrong-with-
title-ix [https://perma.cc/MY68-AWBL] (noting that the number of university administrators “has 
more than doubled in” recent decades, and that much of their work is related to compliance). 
 209. Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges Than Most 
People Know, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2016, 4:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d [https://perma.cc/
4L24-X2BC]. 
 210. OCR is committed by regulation to investigating every complaint it receives, 34 C.F.R. 
§ 100.7(b)-(c) (2016), but the precise nature of that investigation is not specified. According to 
OCR’s current Case Processing Manual, OCR has the discretion to dismiss a complaint without 
opening a formal investigation, and to close an existing investigation, for a number of reasons. 
See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CASE PROCESSING MANUAL 9–13 (2015), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcpm.pdf [https://perma.cc/E377-YLMC]. OCR 
is also committed by regulation to conducting “periodic compliance reviews,” 34 C.F.R. 
§ 100.7(a), but retains broad discretion in how and when it chooses to do so. See Catherine Y. 
Kim, Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, 43 FLA. ST. L. REV. 91, 115–20 (2015).  
 211. See Jake New, Campus Sexual Assault in a Trump Era, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov. 
10, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/10/trump-and-gop-likely-try-scale-back-
title-ix-enforcement-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/3SS7-TXZB]; Robin Wilson, Trump 
Administration May Back Away from Title IX, but Campuses Won’t, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
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Consider, as well, the other key piece of OCR’s recent campaign: 
informal guidance, as contrasted with binding, notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.212 A defining feature of informal guidance is that it is less 
fixed than formal rules and therefore easier to abandon. Recall how 
quickly the Bush administration shelved OCR’s 2001 sexual 
harassment guidance. Note, as well, the revocation of OCR’s 
controversial transgender bathroom guidance, shortly after the 
confirmation of Trump appointee Betsy DeVos as Secretary of 
Education.213 Under DeVos’s leadership, the DOE seems likely to 
emulate this move with regard to the 2011 DCL and other Obama 
administration sexual assault guidance.214 Private lawsuits by 
 
(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-Administration-May-Back/238382 
[https://perma.cc/3YQN-9WJ]. For a discussion of the susceptibility of OCR’s enforcement 
discretion to presidential influence, as suggested by the Clinton and Bush II administrations’ 
“significant political influence over the agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion,” see Kim, 
supra note 210, at 109, 116–20. See also James S. Murphy, The Office for Civil Rights’s Volatile 
Power, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/ 
the-office-for-civil-rights-volatile-power/519072 [https://perma.cc/FNX4-5ZGQ] (providing a 
journalistic account of the “pendulum swings” at OCR “between Republican and Democratic 
administrations”).  
 212. This strategy is not unique to OCR. See Nina A. Mendelson, Guidance Documents and 
Regulatory Beneficiaries, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 8 (2006) (“Federal agencies rely heavily 
on guidance documents, and their volume is massive.”). See generally Robert A. Anthony, 
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal 
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992) (documenting the use of 
informal guidance by the Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, and many other agencies). Nor is OCR’s use 
of this strategy new. See Kim, supra note 210, at 114 (noting that “OCR has issued more than fifty 
guidance documents over the past twenty-five years” under both Republican and Democratic 
administrations).  
 213. Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Colleagues (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/941551/download [https://perma.cc/J6DM-N23]. 
 214. Nick Anderson, Under DeVos, Education Department Likely to Make Significant Shift 
on Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
grade-point/wp/2017/01/18/under-devos-education-department-likely-to-make-significant-shift-
on-sexual-assault/?utm_term=.20f925b4a90f [https://perma.cc/4G59-F8FW]; see also New, supra 
note 211 (noting the precarious status of OCR’s sexual assault guidance in the face of both a 
Trump administration and a GOP-controlled Congress); Peter Schmidt, Vocal Critic of the Office 
of Civil Rights Likely to Lead It, CHRON. HIGHER ED. (Feb. 17, 2017), http://
www.chronicle.com/article/Vocal-Critic-of-Office-for/239225 [https://perma.cc/2HA8-ENYT] 
(reporting that under the Trump administration, the new head of OCR will likely be a vocal critic 
of the agency’s recent approach to sexual assault). The 2013 Campus SaVE Act, which expands 
the scope of the Clery Act, will prevent a complete reversal, but the Act does not codify all aspects 
of OCR’s recent guidance. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 
113-4, § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89–92. For example, the Act says nothing about the standard of evidence 
that should be employed in campus disciplinary proceedings. See Susan Hanley Duncan, The 
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disgruntled accused students, alleging violations of due process (and in 
some instances, violations of their own rights under Title IX), could 
also require OCR to modify its approach.215 
Even as to that army of Title IX coordinators—in which one 
scholar sees OCR’s “colonization” of colleges and universities216—
there is the possibility of change. Research suggests that many Title IX 
coordinators come to that role with no prior experience dealing with 
sexual misconduct,217 that they often have substantial institutional 
responsibilities outside of Title IX,218 and that turnover is common.219 
In other words, these do not appear to be the influential “mezzo-level” 
bureaucrats that, according to political scientists, have helped entrench 
policies in other contexts.220 
 
Devil Is in the Details: Will the Campus SaVE Act Provide More or Less Protection to Victims of 
Campus Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 452–53 (2014).  
 215. For a comprehensive list of these lawsuits, see the database maintained by TITLE IX FOR 
ALL, http://www.titleixforall.com [https://perma.cc/T7M8-YCYN]. For a recently published 
discussion of such suits, see Emily D. Safko, Note, Are Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: 
The Need for Judicial Review and Additional Due Process Protections in Light of New Case Law, 
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 2305–23 (2016). To be clear, I am not arguing that OCR has been 
inattentive to due process. See Anderson, supra note 100, at 32 (noting that OCR has consistently 
affirmed its commitment to the due process rights of parties accused of misconduct); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Students Accused of Sexual Misconduct Had Title IX Rights 
Violated By Wesley College, Says U.S. Department of Education (Oct. 12, 2016), http://
www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/students-accused-sexual-misconduct-had-title-ix-rights-violated
-wesley-college-says-us-department-education [https://perma.cc/3BAM-VETM] (publicizing 
OCR’s finding “that Wesley College violated Title IX by failing to provide accused students with 
essential procedural protections”). My point is that judicial guidance on this issue is likely to 
emerge and that it will affect OCR’s policies and practices. 
 216. R. Shep Melnick, Adversarial Legalism Meets Political Polarization (Feb. 29, 2016) 
(unpublished lecture) (on file with author).  
 217. Christine Paul, Navigating Title IX and Gender Based Campus Violence: An Analysis 
of the Roles and Experiences of Title IX Coordinators 51 (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Los Angeles), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/422513r6 [https://
perma.cc/FRQ2-AYV6]. But see June, supra note 203 (noting that among the wave of new Title 
IX coordinators are “former lawyers with the Office for Civil Rights and longtime equal-
opportunity advocates”).  
 218. See Paul, supra note 217, at 90; see also Sarah Brown, Many Title IX Coordinators Are 
New to the Job and Juggling Many Duties, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 9, 2015), http://www.
chronicle.com/article/Many-Title-IX-Coordinators-Are/231457 [https://perma.cc/N92U-XMXG] 
(discussing the results of a survey conducted at over 400 universities finding that only 10 percent 
of coordinators and Title IX officials “had no other major responsibilities” outside of their official 
Title IX duties).  
 219. See Paul, supra note 217, at 99; see also Koon, supra note 189 (documenting a “revolving 
door” at the University of Arkansas’s Title IX coordinator’s office).  
 220. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 
19–21 (2001). If it turns out that turnover is not as common as is perceived, we might reach 
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Indeed, as explained below, Title IX coordinators seem more 
likely to implicate a different strand of political science research, on 
the phenomenon of “conversion.” The term refers to the often subtle 
process by which “political actors are able to redirect institutions or 
policies to new ends—that is, use them for purposes beyond their 
original intent”—or even to reverse course completely.221 Conversion 
is particularly likely to appear in venues that are hard for outsiders to 
monitor, such as bureaucracies.222 And notably, the process occurs 
without accompanying changes in formal policies.223 
To be certain, not all structures are ripe for this kind of change, 
but the sexual assault policies and configurations that OCR has 
incentivized may well be. Conversion tends to occur when there is a 
“status quo bias” at the level of formal policymaking—as, for example, 
when the most authoritative decisionmaking body is politically 
polarized.224 Congress fits that description well,225 making a major 
amendment to Title IX unlikely. Conversion also tends to occur when 
there is a “well-organized and well-resourced” interest group that 
“lack[s] a large social base” and thus wishes to avoid a legislative battle, 
but which nonetheless seeks to undo or remake an existing policy.226 
This might be an apt characterization of the most prominent opponent 
of OCR’s campus sexual assault policies, the civil libertarian 
 
different conclusions. See generally Judith Taylor, Who Manages Feminist-Inspired Reform? An 
In-Depth Look at Title IX Coordinators in the United States, 19 GENDER & SOC. 358 (2005) 
(finding that although Title IX coordinators in a sample of public school districts did not tend to 
come to their jobs with a strong commitment to gender equality, some developed that 
commitment over time).  
 221. Jacob S. Hacker, Paul Pierson & Kathleen Thelen, Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces 
of Institutional Change 2 (Sept. 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2303593 [https://perma.cc/85LW-SFWN]. 
 222. See id. at 4, 8–9 (explaining that conversion occurs when “actors are (1) able to redirect 
an institution or policy to serve ends distinct from those of its creators while (2) leaving its formal 
rules in place”). In the United States, examples include businesses’ conversion of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act from a measure designed to regulate big business into a tool to limit union 
organization, id. at 2, and elite economists’ conversion of the Social Security program “from a 
hybrid compromise between private savings and social insurance” when it was initially enacted in 
1935 “to a clear-cut concept of social insurance” by 1939. Daniel Béland, Ideas and Institutional 
Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy Drift, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 20, 25 (2007). 
 223. See Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 221, at 3. 
 224. Id. at 11. 
 225. On political polarization and its effect on Congress’s ability to make policy, see generally 
AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL 
POLARIZATION (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2016); Geoffrey C. Layman, 
Thomas M. Carsey & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics: 
Characteristics, Causes and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83 (2006). 
 226. Hacker, Pierson & Thelen, supra note 221, at 28–29. 
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Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE).227 As yet, no 
coherent grassroots social movement seeks to undo OCR’s work on 
college campuses,228 but FIRE and its sympathizers are on the case.229 
A final circumstance that appears to enable conversion is 
“institutional ambiguity,” the condition of having “multiple, 
noncomplementary logics or goals.”230 Such “mutable institutional 
meanings” create openings for manipulation.231 The institutional 
configurations that OCR has incentivized on college campuses fit the 
bill. It is not clear whether these configurations exist primarily to 
guarantee educational equality, to protect students from sexual 
violation, to demand fair and equal treatment in campus disciplinary 
 
 227. Founded in 1999 by history professor Alan Charles Kors and attorney Harvey Silvergate, 
FIRE has long critiqued campus disciplinary procedures and their role in what Kors and 
Silvergate see as a narrowing of free expression and free inquiry on college campuses. Mission, 
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/about-us/mission [https://
perma.cc/K4VB-W9NL]. See generally ALAN CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGATE, THE 
SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S CAMPUSES (1998) 
(emphasizing the importance of these rights and criticizing their erosion on college campuses).  
 228. Such a movement may be in the works, however. See, e.g., Novkov, supra note 199, at 
607 (describing the activism of a “men’s rights movement” around this issue); Fred Barbash, 
‘Toxic Environment’ for Sons Accused of Campus Sex Offenses Turns Mothers into Militants, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/
08/29/toxic-environment-for-sons-accused-of-campus-sex-offenses-turns-mothers-to-militants/?
utm_term=.4a1b3e28771e [https://perma.cc/7ZTU-C3NJ] (providing evidence of a nascent 
parents’ movement, committed to fair treatment for college-age children accused of assault); 
Charles Huckabee, U. of Minnesota Football Team Calls a Boycott to Protest Players’ Suspensions, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 15. 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/u-of-minnesota-
football-team-calls-a-boycott-to-protest-players-suspensions/116162 [https://perma.cc/2A6A-JV
QK] (documenting a college football team’s decision to boycott all team activities in protest of a 
sexual assault investigation that resulted in the university’s suspension of ten players); Caroline 
Kitchens, Mothers for Due Process, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 7, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/384780/mothers-due-process-caroline-kitchens [https://perma.cc/U5
DB-RMS2] (describing the founding of Families Advocating for Campus Equality by three 
women whose sons “experienced [a] nightmare of false accusations” of sexual assault and 
“subsequent railroading by university courts”); Max Kutner, The Other Side of the College Sexual 
Assault Crisis, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/18/other-side-
sexual-assault-crisis-403285.html [https://perma.cc/W9F4-XBRF] (“‘Things are starting to 
snowball. There’s kind of a gathering storm of resistance,’ says Jonathan Taylor, founder of Boys 
and Men in Education.”). 
 229. See generally ROBERT L. SHIBLEY, TWISTING TITLE IX (2016) (detailing what the author 
views as government overreach in its use of Title IX); FIRE Aims to Challenge Legality of Federal 
Sexual Misconduct Mandate, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://www.thefire.org/fire-aims-to-challenge-legality-of-federal-sexual-misconduct-mandate 
[https://perma.cc/VBU8-4QNA] (inviting students to help it challenge the legality of OCR’s 
enforcement campaign). 
 230. Philip Rocco & Chloe Thurston, From Metaphors to Measures: Observable Indicators of 
Gradual Institutional Change, 34 J. PUB. POL’Y 35, 44 (2013).  
 231. Id. at 44–45.  
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proceedings, to shield the institution from legal liability, or to change 
norms around gender, sexuality, and risk-taking. In short, it would not 
be surprising, in just a few short years, to see campus Title IX 
bureaucracies as robust as ever but being deployed in a different way, 
with perhaps no commitment to a right to be free from sexual violence. 
But, last, it bears noting how little we know about the relationship 
between OCR’s handiwork and individuals’ perceptions of their rights, 
and hence how little we can say about the consequences of the kinds of 
changes flagged here. Scholars should pursue this question, keeping in 
mind that rights consciousness and rights claiming may be as much 
about culture as they are about formal law and legal structures. Indeed, 
we should be alert to the possibility that OCR has not been leading 
here, but following. Understandings of sexual violence may have 
already shifted among a powerful segment of the population and Title 
IX may merely be a vehicle for “advanc[ing] the pace of cultural 
change.”232 If this is true, future policy changes coming from OCR may 
not matter as much as scholars assume.233 
C. Incomplete Rights 
Perhaps the most important aspect of administratively created 
rights is their incompleteness, owing to the incompleteness of agencies’ 
jurisdictions. Formally, OCR’s reach is limited to the educational 
institutions that accept federal funds. This jurisdiction is hardly 
trivial—it encompasses over twenty million enrollees in postsecondary 
 
 232. Novkov, supra note 199, at 608; see also Newman & Sander, supra note 144 (describing 
KYIX activists as seeking “culture change”); Emily Suran, Note, Title IX and Social Media: Going 
Beyond the Law, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 273, 308 (2014) (contending that despite Title IX’s 
“ineffective[ness]” as a legal tool, victims of sexual violence have been able to use it to “prompt[] 
a shift in culture,” thanks in large part to savvy uses of social media).   
 233. A salient comparison here might be to the Food and Drug Administration’s efforts to 
restrict the sale and marketing of cigarettes to youth in the 1990s, in a climate in which many 
Americans had come to see tobacco as extraordinarily addictive and dangerous. See Theodore 
Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson and the Norm of Agency Continuity, in 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 334, 364 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & 
Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2011) (chronicling the Supreme Court’s invalidation of these efforts and 
noting that “even without the binding force of the federal rules,” the agency “almost met” its 
“bold desire to cut youth smoking in half within seven years”); see also Johnson, supra note 159, 
at 1400 (noting that once an agency issues an equality directive, even informally, that directive 
“can be sustained by [its] own political economy”).  
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institutions and tens of millions more at the elementary and secondary 
levels234—but it is far from universal. 
Such jurisdictional limits raise equality concerns. In this case, it 
means that individuals who are no longer, or have never been, part of 
educational communities have no access to the administratively 
created right. To the extent that such individuals want to assert a right 
to be free from sexual violence, they must do so in spaces (state courts) 
and through systems (state and local law enforcement) that have been 
notoriously unreceptive to such claims.235 Important reforms have 
occurred in recent decades,236 but scholars and activists continue to 
document shortcomings, ranging from failures to investigate 
complaints of sexual assault237 to disturbingly low arrest and 
prosecution rates.238 These state and local realities raise the prospect of 
a “dual system” of sexual assault law: one for relatively elite, educated 
young adults (the people who appear to be the prime beneficiaries of 
OCR’s current campaign) and the other for everyone else.239 
Agencies’ limited jurisdiction may be problematic in another way, 
as well: it implies that agencies, or even different branches of the same 
agency, may adopt varying approaches to the same basic right, and that 
some administrative constituencies thus may have weaker rights than 
others.240 Over time, the right at issue might become uncontroversial, 
but so too might its variability. 
 
 234. Digest of Education Statistics: 2015, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_303.10.asp?referrer=report [https://perma.cc/
D9GQ-K9YG].  
 235. Anderson, supra note 100, at 1959–62. 
 236. Id. at 1949–52. 
 237. Id. at 1959–62. 
 238. Id.; Alderden & Ullman, supra note 181, at 525–26.  
 239. The phrase “dual system” comes from the equal protection scholar Jacobus tenBroek. 
He famously documented one system of family law for the poor, articulated through public 
benefits laws and enforced by administrators, and another system for everyone else, embodied in 
the family law provisions of the state civil code. See generally Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual 
System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status: Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 
(1964); Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and 
Present Status: Part II, 16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964); Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System 
of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status: Part III, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) 
[hereinafter tenBroek, Duel System: Part III]. Conventional family law had flaws, to be sure, but 
the family law of the poor was shot through with “punitive, repressive, discriminatory, [and] 
exclusionary” tendencies. tenBroek, Dual System: Part III, supra, at 680. 
 240. This is not a theoretical point: historical case studies have documented this phenomenon. 
Compare Tani, supra note 165 (arguing that administrators within HEW adopted a generous 
reading of welfare recipients’ right to equal protection in the 1950s), with Milligan, supra note 158 
(arguing that, during the same period and in the same agency, administrators adopted a narrow 
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Regarding the right to be free from sexual violence, this disparity 
is already apparent. Compare OCR’s efforts to protect the rights of 
college students to the policies and practices documented in the U.S. 
Department of Defense, which has jurisdiction over members of the 
armed forces. Like OCR, the Department of Defense has devoted 
increased attention to the issue of sexual assault in recent years. It now 
recognizes a broader array of behavior as sexual misconduct and 
encourages reporting and investigation.241 According to critics, 
however, the agency’s existing policies and procedures continue to 
enable retaliation against victims who disclose sexual assault. When 
victims do report, policies and procedures incentivize the investigator 
(the victim’s commanding officer) to dismiss claims, often by deflecting 
blame onto the victim.242 
Even more stark is the difference between these two groups and 
prisoners. Americans have a long tradition of according prisoners 
fewer and weaker rights, but if the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 
2003243 is any indication (enacted with unanimous support from both 
parties), there is an emerging consensus around prisoners’ right to 
freedom from sexual violence.244 The actual content of that right has 
depended largely on administrators, however—on the findings and 
interpretations of the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 
charged by Congress with developing national standards for 
correctional facilities; on the approval and enforcement discretion of 
the DOJ, charged with formally promulgating standards, monitoring 
compliance, and imposing sanctions for noncompliance; and on the 
 
reading of the right to equal protection when it came to children and public education). See 
generally Lee, supra note 161 (documenting opposing approaches to the constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection in two agencies during the same era).  
 241. See generally Jessica A. Turchik & Susan M. Wilson, Sexual Assault in the U.S. Military: 
A Review of the Literature and Recommendations for the Future, 15 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT 
BEHAV. 267 (2010) (examining sexual assault within the military and assessing the adequacy of 
the military’s response to these problems). 
 242. Rhode, supra note 184, at 21–23; Ann-Marie Woods, Note, A “More Searching Judicial 
Inquiry”: The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1329, 1350 
(2014). 
 243. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2012)). 
 244. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 3 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2012)) 
(establishing “a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons the United 
States”). See generally Valerie Jenness & Michael Smyth, The Passage and Implementation of the 
Prison Rape Elimination Act: Legal Endogeneity and the Uncertain Road from Symbolic Law to 
Instrumental Effects, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 489 (2011) (documenting the reform efforts that 
led to the enactment of the law, including the human rights framing adopted by key stakeholders). 
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day-to-day actions of federal, state, and local correctional authorities. 
The results have been sobering. Prisoners had to wait nearly ten years 
for the implementation standards to take effect.245 And although those 
standards do seem likely to endure changes in the political winds—
because, unlike the 2011 DCL, the standards emerged from formal 
notice-and-comment rulemaking—prisoners’ advocates have already 
voiced sharp criticisms, with some noting the standards’ adverse effect 
on prisoners’ rights.246 
Perhaps there are good reasons for allowing the right to freedom 
from sexual violence to vary from group to group. Perhaps not. But 
such inquiries will not proceed at all without the crucial first step—
taken here—of acknowledging the existence of separate administrative 
tracks and treating these tracks as historical constructions rather than 
natural divisions.247 
CONCLUSION 
“Every woman and man has a God-given right to be free from 
sexual violence,” Vice President Biden insisted in 2014, twenty years 
after the enactment of VAWA’s novel civil rights remedy and fourteen 
years after the Supreme Court eviscerated the same.248 The setting for 
this remark, notably, was a press conference to announce OCR’s 2014 
Title IX guidance for colleges and universities. Thanks in large part to 
OCR’s efforts, numerous colleges and universities have now translated 
 
 245. See National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape; Final Rule, 77 
Fed. Reg. 37, 106, 37,106 (June 17, 2012) (providing an effective date of Aug. 20, 2012). 
 246. See Gabriel Arkles, Prison Rape Elimination Act Litigation and the Perpetuation of 
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Lenny Gallo, Human Rights and Prison Rape, 2 21ST CENTURY SOC. JUST. 1, 4–5 (2015) 
(observing that the Prison Rape Elimination Act is often discriminatory in application, making it 
far from the human rights milestone that it appears to be); Giovanna Shay, PREA’s Peril, 7 NE. 
U. L.J. 21, 21 (2015) (seeing in the Prison Rape Elimination Act a danger of “creating more 
‘LGBT-friendly’ ways of celling people without reducing our nation’s unprecedented reliance on 
incarceration”). 
 247. For a useful model, consider the scholarship by historians and social scientists on the 
“two-track” welfare state. TANI, supra note 168, at 9 & n.26. 
 248. Timothy M. Phelps, Guidelines to Curb Campus Sexual Assaults Raise Concerns for 
Accused, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-
nn-guidelines-to-curb-campus-sexual-assaults-20140429-story.html [https://perma.cc/F4XA-C9
FF]; see also Michele Richinick, Obama Admin: Freedom from Sexual Assault a Basic Human 
Right, MSNBC (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe-17 [https://
perma.cc/6F4V-U7GT] (quoting Biden as describing “[f]reedom from sexual assault” as “a basic 
human right”). 
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Biden’s natural law claim into something more like positive law. In 
locations from Texas to Alaska, and in institutions ranging from small 
theological seminaries to major state universities, formal policies 
inform members of campus communities that they “have the right to 
be free from sexual violence.”249 
The central claim of this Article is that scholars have not focused 
enough on this story—the story of how, in protecting the right to 
educational equality, OCR has become enmeshed in a decades-long 
campaign for a broader and arguably more fundamental right: the right 
of all Americans, in all pockets of the nation, to be free from sexual 
violence. Scholars will no doubt continue to explore OCR’s respect for 
due process and its fealty to congressional mandates—classic 
administrative law concerns. But my hope is that we never again lose 
sight of the social and political contexts excavated here, and that 
administrative scholarship more generally will consider the longer 
historical arcs that inform what happens inside the administrative state. 
Other aspects of this Article are more in the nature of an 
invitation—to join me in exploring a set of research questions that, to 
me, feel urgent and understudied. No additional research is needed, 
however, to support one final observation. As I have written elsewhere, 
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rights language is not just a way for people to make claims on the state; 
it can also be a way for the state to make claims on people.250 When the 
state speaks to subjects in rights terms, it does not simply say, “I see 
you as a rights-bearing individual.” It makes a statement about 
jurisdiction, and invites the individual to invoke that jurisdiction, even 
as against other powerful actors. It says, “You are mine and I am yours. 
Come to me for protection, and hold me to account.” These are potent 
messages about the content of citizenship and the scope of state power. 
In the post–Civil War United States, this has been a prominent and 
important theme.251 
But the state is not a monolith, nor is its logic ever entirely 
stable,252 so we should not be surprised to see pockets of the state, such 
as particular administrative agencies, pioneering new rights claims or 
salvaging rights claims that have been gained and lost in other venues. 
This, at the end of the day, may be the best way to understand OCR’s 
recent work in the realm of sexual violence, even if OCR itself has 
proclaimed much more modest aims. As with Congress’s enactment of 
VAWA, OCR’s enforcement campaign has sent signals about both the 
nature of American citizenship and the nature of American 
governance. It has signaled that vulnerability is not a disqualification 
from citizenship, and that vulnerability itself may be produced by the 
state. It has signaled that part of the work of the national government 
is to see across intra-jurisdictional boundaries, spotting recurring 
patterns of oppression. And it has signaled that individual instances of 
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violence and violation may have an aggregate meaning—that they may 
systematically disadvantage an entire segment of the political 
community, in ways that strike at the core of what it means to belong 
to the whole.  
Whether those signals will fade or strengthen in the coming years, 
it is impossible to say. Clearly, however, many people have heard those 
signals and the promises they carry. I have heard those signals and am 
moved—even as I recognize the complexities and costs of translating 
them into concrete practices. If history is any indication, adherents to 
this vision of citizenship and governance will continue to pursue it, in 
whatever forum is available. 
